Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compensation by Alexander, Janet Cooper
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 53 
Issue 2 Winter 2003: Symposium - After 
Disaster: The September 11th Compensation 
Fund and the Future of Civil Justice 
Article 15 
Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compensation 
Janet Cooper Alexander 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Janet C. Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compensation, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 627 (2013) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol53/iss2/15 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 




Within eleven days of September 11, 2001, Congress passed, and the
President signed into law, legislation to provide compensation for the
losses caused by the terrorist attacks.' The Air Transportation Safety
and System Stabilization Act (ATSA) included approximately $15 bil-
lion in loans and guarantees for the airline industry and a victim com-
pensation program, which was then expected to cost between $3 and
$4 billion, for those who were injured or killed in the attacks and their
families. The victim compensation program was an afterthought. The
first recorded mention of adding victim compensation to the airline
bailout occurred only three days before the bill was signed into law.
Scant consideration was given to the details, particularly the procedu-
ral details, of the program. Yet the program was not placed within an
existing procedural or administrative framework, such as the federal
or state courts, or a federal agency, such as the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) or the Department of Health and
Human Services. Rather, it was created as a freestanding program to
be administered by a special master who would be appointed by the
Attorney General and whose awards would be paid directly from the
national treasury. Nearly every detail of the program, from the fac-
tors to be considered in setting individual awards to the procedure for
filing claims, was left to be filled in by the Special Master.
* Frederick I. Richman Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. Grateful thanks to my inval-
uable and indefatigable research assistant, Ron Fein, whose help included primary responsibility
for the summary of the legislative history and structure of the September 11th Victim Compen-
sation Fund that appears as the Appendix to this Article. Special thanks to Bob Peck of the
Center for Constitutional Litigation, who provided information about the origin of the victim
compensation proposal and provided me a copy of the initial draft proposal, to Deborah Hensler
and participants in a workshop on designing victim compensation programs, sponsored by the
Sanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation in April 2002, to participants at the 9th Annual
Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy, and to Steve Landsman and Bob Clifford for
making the Symposium possible.
1. Pub. L. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 note (West Supp.
2003)) [hereinafter ATSA]. The victim compensation program is contained in Title IV of the
Act. September l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. at 237-41.
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As the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 took
shape through Special Master Kenneth Feinberg's promulgation of
regulations and processing of claims, claimants and others criticized
the fairness and legitimacy of the procedural rules as well as the ad-
ministration of the Fund.2 Many of these complaints concerned mat-
ters such as the use of grids and caps, whether the regulations should
have been written to allow larger awards,3 the methodology and evi-
dentiary basis for estimating lost future income, whether the collateral
source rule should apply and to what kinds of payments, whether
same-sex partners should be able to file claims, and whether the pro-
gram should be expanded to include victims of other past terrorist
acts. 4 Questions about the more fundamental issue whether a govern-
ment-funded program to provide for victims of terrorist attacks should
be modeled on mass tort litigation at all were muted, at least at the
beginning.
President George W. Bush has predicted that the "war on terror-
ism" will last for a long time, perhaps a decade, and that more attacks
will certainly occur on U.S. soil. 5 The metaphorical war has expanded
to include a real war and occupation, first in Afghanistan and then in
2. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTS, at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensa-
tion/comments.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2003) (updated periodically); David W. Chen, 7 Fami-
lies Sue Administrator of 9/11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2003, at Bl; David W. Chen, Worst-Hit
Firm Faults Fairness of Sept. 11 Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at Al.
3. The mean award for death claims is currently around $1.8 million, with a high of $6.9 mil-
lion and a low of $250,000, after offsets. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR DECEASED
VICTIMS: AWARD PAYMENT STATISTICS, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/
payments-deceased/html (last visited Jan. 26, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DE-
CEASED VICTIMS]. The highest award to an injured claimant to date is $7.9 million. U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY VIcriMs: AWARD PAYMENT STATISTICS,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments-injury (last visited Jan. 26,
2004) [hereinafter U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PERSONAL INJURY VICrIMS].
4. Congress later passed legislation directing the President to prepare "a legislative proposal
to ensure fair, equitable, and prompt compensation for all United States victims of international
terrorism," both in the future and retroactively to November 1, 1979. Departments of Com-
merce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
107-77, § 626(a)-(b), 115 Stat. 748, 803 (2002). The origins of this provision are unclear; it was in
neither the original House nor Senate versions of the bill, and appeared for the first time in the
conference report, with no further explanation. See H.R. REP. No. 107-278, at 57 (2001); 147
CONG. REC. H8001 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 2001). November 1, 1979 was probably selected because
the Iran embassy hostage crisis began on November 4, 1979. Additionally, the House passed a
bill to include victims of the embassy bombings in the 9/11 program; it stalled in the Senate. See
Embassy Employee Compensation Act, H.R. 3375, 107th Cong. (2001).
5. See, e.g., President George W. Bush's Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010920-8.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2003) ("Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does
not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped
and defeated."); More Terror Attacks Likely, Rumsfeld Says, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL,
May 18, 2002, at 10A (quoting Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as saying, "The likelihood
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Iraq. Initially, at least, the Bush Administration argued for war in
Iraq on the ground that Saddam Hussein's regime sponsored interna-
tional terrorism and might provide weapons of mass destruction-
chemical, biological, and nuclear-to terrorists who would use them
against the United States. Even if that threat was oversold or has
been eliminated, there are many potential sources of weapons for such
terrorist attacks. It is timely, then, to consider how the government
should go about compensating future civilian losses in the war against
terrorism.
Although this Article views the problem of designing a compensa-
tion program for future victims of terrorism "through the spectacles of
• * . procedure," 6 procedural design is not just a matter of tinkering
with the details or mechanisms of what has already been done or of
importing familiar procedures into new contexts. Rather, good proce-
dural design flows from foundational questions about the purpose and
function of the institution we are designing. In this case such ques-
tions include:
* What is the purpose of the compensation program?
* What values should the program embody?
* Why should eligible claimants be treated differently from appar-
ently similarly-situated persons?
* Why are existing procedural institutions inadequate to compen-
sate these persons?
The answers to these questions-whether consciously chosen or un-
wittingly assumed-will play a large part in determining the remedy, a
crucial issue for procedural design. As an example, if the relevant
purposes and values lead to a conclusion that every person who was
present at Ground Zero, or their estates, should receive a payment of
$5,000 (or $5 million), no very elaborate procedures will be needed. It
will only be necessary to verify, to a desired degree of accuracy, that
the claimant was indeed present and the address to which to send the
check. If, at the other end of the spectrum, an individualized determi-
nation of harm including all the components of tort damages is
needed, the procedure will be much more complicated and will proba-
bly look a lot like tort litigation. Moreover, these functional consider-
is-because it's not possible to defend at every place at every moment-that there will be an-
other terrorist attack. We should just face that reality.").
6. "Everything that you know of procedure you must carry into every substantive course. You
must read each substantive course, so to speak, through the spectacles of that procedure. For
what substantive law says should be means nothing except in terms of what procedure says you
can make real." KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITs STUDY 9
(1960).
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ations will suggest procedural analogues that can serve as models for
crafting procedural rules.
In this Article, I discuss possible models for a victim compensation
fund, such as mass tort litigation, disaster relief, and insurance; the
implications of these models for procedural design; and some sugges-
tions for designing future victim compensation programs. 7
II. THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001
When Congress passed legislation authorizing compensation for the
victims of September 11, 2001, the compensation program itself was
an afterthought, and the procedures by which the program would be
administered were given almost no thought at all.8 The primary pur-
pose of the legislation was to protect a vital part of the national infra-
structure from collapse. 9 Not only did United Airlines and American
Airlines face massive potential tort liability arising from the Septem-
ber 11th attacks, which made September 11, 2001 "the second-bloodi-
est day in United States history, after the battle of Antietam in the
Civil War," 10 but even more importantly, the consequences of the at-
7. I regret that this Article, like much of the public discussion of the events of September llth,
may seem to focus on those injured or killed at the World Trade Center to the exclusion of the
victims of the attacks on American Airlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon, and
United Flight 93, which was brought down near Shanksville, Pennsylvania.
With respect to the analysis of this Article, the reason is primarily that the death and injury
toll of the Pentagon and Shanksville crashes was within the "normal" range for aviation disas-
ters. The casualties from the Flight 93 crash were limited to the 40 passengers and crew and the
four hijackers, while at the Pentagon site 59 people aboard the plane and 125 on the ground
died, with many more injured. Property damage at the Pennsylvania site was negligible, and
though the Pentagon was seriously damaged, it was not destroyed. The losses associated with
these crashes could easily have been compensated through the tort system within the policy
limits of the insurance on the airplanes. The World Trade Center attack was unique because the
vast majority of the 2,800 dead were on the ground, and the property damage resulting from the
crashes was spectacularly large (as well as arguably unforeseeable). See Eric Lipton, Struggle to
Tally All 9/11 Dead by Anniversary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2002, at Al (As of that date, the official
death tally was 2,807, and the final total was expected to be no fewer than 2,750.). The insurance
carried by United Airlines and American Airlines was far too little to cover such damages and
the excess was far beyond the power of the airlines to pay.
With respect to public perceptions, the destruction of the World Trade Center not only re-
sulted in the loss of many more lives than in previous terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, it was also
captured in many vivid images, involved the destruction of a major landmark and symbol of the
nation's largest city and its financial markets, and was highly salient to the media centered in
New York City.
8. For a fuller discussion of the history of the legislation creating the September l1th Victim
Compensation Fund and a summary of the provisions of the statute and the implementing regu-
lations, see the Appendix.
9. H.R. 2891, 107th Cong. (2001) (stating that the bill's statutory purpose was "[t]o preserve
the continued viability of the United States air transportation system").
10. Lipton, supra note 7.
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tacks threatened the "continued viability" of the entire air transporta-
tion industry.'" All passenger flights were grounded immediately
after the attacks, causing industry losses of approximately $330 million
per day. Fear of further attacks caused a huge drop in passenger de-
mand. 12 The airline industry estimated losses during the coming year
at $24 billion, 13 raising the specter of multiple bankruptcies. Addition-
ally, the risks and uncertainties of future attacks caused insurers to
threaten to refuse to provide coverage, without which the airlines
could not fly. 14
The original version of the legislation, introduced on September 14,
2001, was a simple $15 billion airline relief bill.' 5 While this version
capped the airlines' liability at the amount of the insurance on the
four airplanes, a total of $7 billion, it contained no provision for victim
compensation at all.16 The losses caused by the crashes were esti-
mated at $40 billion.17
Language creating a victim compensation fund was added a week
later to win the votes of House Democrats, who had insisted that the
bill include compensation from the federal government to the dead
and injured and their families as a quid pro quo for restrictions on
11. Id.
12. Hearing on H.R. 2891 To Preserve the Continued Viability of the U.S. Air Transp. Sys., and
on the Fin. Condition of the Airline Indus. in the Aftermath of the Events Which Occurred on
Tuesday, September 11, 2001, Before the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 107th
Cong. 1 (2001), available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/fullchearings/09-19-01/09-19-
Olmemo.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2891]. See also H.R.
COMM. ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, H.R. REP. No. 107-45; Hearing on H.R.
2891 To Preserve the Continued Viability of the U. S. Air Transp. Sys., Before the House Comm.
on Transp. and Infrastructure, 107th Cong 44-45 (2001) (testimony of Leo F. Mullin, Chairman
and CEO, Delta Air Lines) (explaining calculations), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/
committees/Trans/hpwlO7-45.000/hpwlO7-45Of.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
13. Industry operating losses in 2001 (including less than four months following the attacks)
exceeded $10 billion, with net losses of almost $8 billion, compared to operating profits of almost
$7 billion and net profits of $3 billion in 2000. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., BUREAU OF TRANSPOR-
TATION STATISTICS (July 11, 2002), available at http://www.bts.gov/PressReleases/2002/btsl5_02
(last visited Oct. 13, 2003). Within a week of the attacks, the five largest airlines (Continental,
Northwest, American, United, and Delta) all announced significant flight reductions and layoffs
of a total of perhaps 100,000 employees. Hearing on H.R. 2891, supra note 12, at 2.
14. Congress later passed legislation creating a federally administered terrorism risk insurance
program to assure the availability of property and casualty insurance for acts of terrorism and to
protect the insurance industry from the risks and uncertainties of losses arising from terrorist
acts. See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C.A. § 6701 note (West Supp. 2003)) [hereinafter TRIA].
15. See H.R. 2891, 107th Cong. (2001).
16. The bill authorized the President to compensate air carriers from losses sustained as a
result of the September 11th attacks through a combination of direct payments, loans or loan
guarantees, and suspension or modification of the airlines' federal financial obligations. Id.
§ 1(1)-(3).
17. Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 92.
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their ability to sue the airlines.18 The Democrats' proposal, which
would have created a specific fund through federal appropriations that
could also receive funds from insurance, potential defendants, and pri-
vate contributions and that would have been administered by a newly-
created Article I court, was significantly different from the bill that
soon became law. The Republican leadership was unwilling to agree
to the creation of a "September 11th Compensation Court" affiliated
with the Southern District of New York and headed by an Article I
judge appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to a five-year term.19 Instead, they drafted a bill creating a
more ad hoc structure that strongly resembles the procedure for ad-
ministering mass tort settlements. This bill was quickly enacted and
signed by President Bush.
The new statute20 created a program (not really a fund, as the pay-
ments were to be made from the Treasury as awarded by the Special
Master and were not limited to any particular individual or aggregate
dollar amount) under which claimants21 would receive compensation
from the federal government in exchange for giving up their right to
sue anyone but the hijackers and their accomplices. 22 Just twenty-two
hours elapsed between the first recorded mention of a victim compen-
sation program and September 22, when the President signed the bill
into law.23 The compensation program was not examined through the
committee process, and the entire bill (of which the provisions creat-
ing the Fund were only a small part) was debated for just over an hour
in both the House and Senate. 24 Very little discussion of the victim
compensation provisions took place during this abbreviated debate.25
18. The idea apparently was originally discussed in a meeting between representatives of the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) and the Democratic leadership on September
19. See id.
19. For a more detailed discussion of the initial proposal, see infra text accompanying notes
130-135.
20. ATSA, supra note 1.
21. Claimants were persons injured on September 11, 2001 as a result of the attacks, or their
estates or personal representatives. ATSA, supra note 1, § 405(c)(2)(A)-(C); see also Appendix,
text accompanying notes 70-84.
22. ATSA, supra note 1, § 405(c)(3)(B)(i)-(ii).
23. See Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status for the 107th Congress, H.R. 2926,
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binfbdquery/z?d107:HR02926:@@@L&summ2=M&#status
(last visited Oct. 13, 2003). The first mention came on September 19, in the committee hearing
on H.R. 2891, when Rep. Max Sandlin asked the CEO of World Airways, "Do you think some of
the money that we set aside, and certainly we want to help the airlines, should some of that be
set aside for a claim fund for the victims?" H.R. COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCrURE, H.R.
REP. No. 107-45, at 152 (2001). The legislative history is discussed in more detail in the Appen-
dix infra text accompanying notes 5-53.
24. See Library of Congress, supra note 23.
25. See Appendix notes 22-53 and accompanying text.
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Perhaps partly because a primary purpose of the September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund was to insulate United Airlines and
American Airlines from tort liability for the loss of life and property
resulting from the use of their airplanes as weapons of mass destruc-
tion, partly because those drafting the act were familiar with proce-
dures used in distributing settlement funds in mass tort cases, partly
because members of the American Trial Lawyers Association
(ATLA) were active in the drafting of the bill, and partly because leg-
islators wanted to express the generosity of the American people to-
ward the victims, the process created by the statute and its
implementing regulations looks very much like the procedures com-
monly used in administering mass tort settlements. The bill set forth a
bare bones definition of eligible claimants, adopted a measure of com-
pensation that looked a lot like tort damages, directed that regulations
be promulgated to implement the program, and authorized the ap-
pointment of a special master to oversee the administration of
claims.2 6 Potential disputes over the purpose and operation of the
program were avoided by keeping both the statute and the legislative
debate short. The details were very much left to be filled in by regula-
tion, and it turned out that it was the Special Master who, by promul-
gating regulations, in large part determined the procedural form of the
program-and, indeed, much of its substantive content. 27
The goal of persuading potential plaintiffs to opt out of the tort sys-
tem dictated the nature of the compensation provided under the pro-
gram. 28 In order to be attractive to potential tort plaintiffs, the
compensation would have to be comparable to what they could expect
to receive from the tort system.29 The statutory language was clearly
modeled on tort damages. The Special Master was directed to deter-
mine "the extent of the harm to the claimant, including any economic
and non-economic losses" and then to determine the amount of com-
pensation "based on the harm to the claimant, the facts of the claim,
26. See ATSA, supra note 1, §§ 401-407. See also Appendix text accompanying notes 130-149.
27. See ATSA, supra note 1, §§ 404, 407. See also Appendix text accompanying notes 130-149.
28. For plaintiffs who elected to remain in the tort system, the statute created a federal cause
of action for the September 11th hijackings and crashes, made it the exclusive remedy for dam-
age claims against any defendant other than the hijackers and their co-conspirators, limited the
airlines' liability for all claims (including property damage and punitive damages) to the amount
of the insurance coverage, and consolidated all claims for property damage, personal injury, and
death in the Southern District of New York. ATSA, supra note 1.
29. Of course, there was one important difference that was largely ignored by critics who
argued that compensation from the Fund was too low: unlike tort plaintiffs, claimants did not
have to prove that a particular defendant was legally liable for their losses, or run the risk that
the defendant would become insolvent or otherwise fail to satisfy the judgment. See infra notes
76-86 and accompanying text.
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and the individual circumstances of the claimant. ' 30 Because the
awards were determined according to tort principles, they were based
largely on the victim's earnings at the time of the crashes. (The regu-
lations limited non-economic damages to a flat sum that varied only
according to the number of the victim's survivors.)31 The statute cov-
ered only claims for "physical harm" or death; no provision was made
for compensation for property damage or any other economic loss. 32
Three important assumptions were embedded in the statutory com-
pensation scheme: (1) Mass tort litigation is the paradigm for how to
compensate victims of blameworthy acts including (international) ter-
rorism. (2) Global settlement of all claims through a centralized pro-
cess in which determinations of individual compensation are made
outside the courts is the preferable resolution of mass tort litigation.
(3) Claims administration under a special master or other bureaucratic
form is a cheaper, faster, and more equitable method of compensation
than litigation. These assumptions underlie the decision to reject the
Democrats' proposal to create an Article I court to administer a fund
created by Congress and containing not only federal appropriations
but also insurance proceeds, corporate payments, and private charita-
ble contributions, and instead to turn the process over to a "special
master" to administer a government entitlement program in an essen-
tially ad hoc manner.33
There are two reasons why the procedural structure of the Septem-
ber 11th Fund has been unsatisfactory. First, no real thought was
given to procedural design. The drafters, in a tearing hurry and with
many other large and urgent matters to think about, took the simplest
procedural form that was ready to hand-give the victims compensa-
tion comparable to what they would have recovered in a successful
tort suit, appoint a special master who is experienced at administering
tort settlement funds and give him a blank check on the Treasury, and
30. ATSA, supra note 1, § 405(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). Punitive damages were excluded. Id.
§ 405(b)(5). Awards were to be reduced by collateral source payments, although the regulations
interpreted this provision not to apply to payments from charities. See id. §§ 402(4), 405(b)(6);
28 C.F.R. § 104.47(b)(1)-(2) (2002).
31. 28 C.F.R. § 104.44 (2002).
32. See ATSA, supra note 1, §§ 403, 405(c)(2)(A)-(C). Congress began to address the issue of
property damage through TRIA, which required insurers to make terrorism insurance available
to the same extent as other types of coverage, made the federal government responsible for
paying up to almost 90% of such claims, and set up a mechanism for recouping amounts paid for
such claims through increases in premiums. See TRIA, supra note 14.
33. Of course the Special Master promulgated comprehensive regulations following exhaus-
tive hearings and extensive public comments. But the decision of how to go about the process of
promulgating regulations, as well as the scope and content of the regulations, was left largely to
the Special Master's discretion.
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let him work out the details. This ad hoc (in fact, ad hominem) ap-
proach may well have been necessary in the chaotic days after Sep-
tember 11th, but the resulting institutional design contains gaps and
internal inconsistencies.
Significantly, differences over the program's procedural form did
emerge even during the lightening-fast drafting process. The Demo-
crats originally proposed a true fund, not an open-ended call on the
federal treasury, that would be administered by a new Article I
court.34 The Republican leadership, however, balked at creating a
legislative court to administer the program and instead created some-
thing that looked like a mass tort settlement facility with a Special
Master (unattached to any court) who reported to the Attorney Gen-
eral. These were important differences, but they were resolved out of
public view and were never subjected to the normal legislative hearing
process.
The second and more fundamental reason for the unsatisfactory
structure of the program is that the central purpose of the Act was not
to compensate victims but to keep the airlines running by, among
other things, protecting them from going broke paying tort judgments.
To a great extent, the concern that the risk of enormous liability might
bankrupt airlines or cause the insurance industry to refuse to provide
coverage framed the issue as one about tort-type compensation.
Some members of Congress appeared to envision payments that
would be roughly equivalent to the tort recoveries that were being
discouraged. 35 Others stated that the purpose of the Fund was not to
"duplicate" the tort system but to help victims and their families to get
back on their feet.36
34. See infra text accompanying notes 131-135.
35. See 147 CONG. REC. H5906 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Robert Turner)
(bill would provide "full recovery for their economic and noneconomic damages"); id. at S959
(statement of Sen. Charles Schumer) (purpose of the victim compensation fund was that without
it, victims in the airplanes would recover but victims on the ground would probably receive
nothing); id. at S9586 (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell) ("My only concern with this bill is
that .. .there is no limit in this legislation on the amount of lawyer fees that personal injury
lawyers can receive for filing lawsuits . .. [T]here is no guarantee that ... the personal injury
lawyers do not end up taking the lion's share of the award."); id. at S9594 (statement of Sen.
Orin Hatch) ("This will help ensure that injured people receive money and receive it faster than
they otherwise would if left to pursue claims through litigation.").
36. See 147 CONG. REC. S9594 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001). Sen. John McCain stated:
No amount of money can begin to compensate the victims for their suffering. Nothing
will make them and their families "whole." It is not the intent of the federal fund to do
this. Nor is it the intent of the fund to duplicate the arbitrary, wildly divergent awards
that sometimes come from our deeply flawed tort system... The intent of the fund is to
ensure that the victims of this unprecedented, unforeseeable, and horrific event, and
their families do not suffer financial hardship.
2003]
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The pressure to enact the legislation immediately was intense, and
this fundamental issue about the purpose of the compensation pro-
gram was not resolved by Congress. The adoption of a tort measure
of damages in what was essentially a federal government entitlement
program guaranteed that the program would have many built-in con-
tradictions. The tension about the purpose of the program continued
throughout the promulgation of the Interim and Final rules, and con-
tinues to this day. For example, families of high-income victims who
died at the World Trade Center filed a class action lawsuit against the
Special Master, the Attorney General, and the Department of Justice
seeking a judicial determination that the regulations shortchange the
families of high-income victims by hundreds of millions of dollars in
violation of the statutory purpose, that lost income should be compen-
sated in full, even for victims who were making millions of dollars a
year, and that damages for pain and suffering should not be capped.37
The government argued in response that the statute is not "a replace-
ment of the tort system"; rather, its purpose is to provide a "sustaina-
ble, realistic and reasonable foundation" for families to rebuild their
lives.38
III. PURPOSES AND VALUES OF VICTIM COMPENSATION
Of course, at one level the purpose of a statutory victim compensa-
tion program is to provide money to the victims or their families. But
why? What was it about these events that made Congress decide that
the federal government should pay money to these persons, and why
was a special program needed?
A. The Tort Model
As we have seen, the primary purpose of the ATSA was to bail out
the airline industry. Victim compensation was added to win the votes
necessary to pass the bill, to provide a quid pro quo-perhaps consti-
tutionally necessary-for retroactively capping the airlines' tort liabil-
ity, and for cosmetic purposes to make a $15 billion airline bailout
more acceptable to the public. This purpose, and the fact that the
legislation was passed after the injuries had occurred, dictated that it
was important to get potential tort plaintiffs to choose to file claims
Id. See also id. at S9599 ("This program is targeted to help the neediest victims and their fami-
lies.") (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
37. See Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); David W. Chen, Relatives'
Lawyers Ask Court To Rule Sept. 11 Fund Unfair, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2003, at D3.
38. Chen, supra note 37. On May 8, 2003, the district court granted the government's motion
for judgment on the pleadings. See Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
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rather than sue the airlines. This, in turn, meant that the expected
value of filing a claim would have to be similar to tort damages.
The choice of (mass) tort damages as the conceptual model is not
surprising. The attacks were unquestionably a gigantic tort that killed
or injured thousands of people and caused massive economic damage.
Additionally, tort litigation is the norm whenever an airplane crashes
or a building falls down. But in this most public of cases, tort litiga-
tion was not suited to the task of compensating victims. Although the
victims of September 11th appeared as "deserving" of large recoveries
as anyone could possibly be, they could not recover damages from the
real culprits, the hijackers and their accomplices, who were either
dead or out of reach. 39
It is common in tort cases with serious injuries in which the primary
tortfeasor is judgment-proof, such as car crashes or nightclub fires, to
seek recovery from secondary defendants such as manufacturers, op-
erators, or premises owners. With respect to the September 11th inju-
ries, however, it seemed neither fair nor in the public interest to
require the possibly negligent airlines or premises owners to pay the
full amount of the damages, especially as they also had suffered large
losses. Both the size of potential judgments and the uncertainty about
whether they would be awarded threatened the financial security of
the airline industry and the continued availability of insurance cover-
age, without which they could not fly. Accordingly, rather than al-
lowing the principles of joint and several liability on the one hand and
foreseeability on the other to define the extent of tort damages against
the solvent potential defendants, Congress gave the airlines a "get-
out-of-liability-free card," limiting their aggregate tort liability to the
amount of insurance coverage for the four airplanes involved. This
decision essentially eliminated potential solvent tort defendants, at
least for victims on the ground.
When there are no solvent defendants, tort victims usually have to
bear the costs of their injuries themselves, with the help of personal
assets and insurance. This outcome was also unacceptable, at least as
to the dead and injured. 40 As the massive outpouring of private char-
39. The possibility of proceeding against the United States or foreign assets of individual (e.g.,
Osama bin Laden) or state sponsors of the September llth attacks is discussed infra at notes
108-110 and accompanying text.
40. No provision was made for government compensation for property damage. Rather, the
owners would have to rely on their own assets or insurance, or (if they did not make a claim
against the Fund for personal injury or death) find someone to sue in court. The limitation on
airline liability, however, applied to all liability arising out of the events of September llth,
including claims for property damage. A few months later, Congress passed legislation designed
to ensure the availability and affordability of anti-terrorism coverage in property and casualty
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ity demonstrated, the public wanted to take care of the victims, not
only out of shock and pity but also as a show of collective unity and
defiance.41 Moreover, the federal government may have been partly
at fault (even though it probably could not be held legally liable) for
security failures that made the hijackings possible, as well as, in a
more general sense, for the foreign policy that the terrorists opposed.
Therefore it could seem logical to craft a solution in which the victims
received something approximating tort damages, but the federal gov-
ernment, on behalf of the nation, would step in and pay.
A further possible reason for setting compensation to approximate
tort damages is the possibility that if Congress absolved the airlines
and other secondary defendants of liability after the fact and left the
victims to fend for themselves, the bailout might be vulnerable to an
attack based on the takings clause. The argument would be that when
Congress capped the airlines' liability at their existing insurance cov-
erage, substituted an exclusive federal cause of action for state law
causes of action, and required claimants to waive all of their claims
arising from the events of September 11th in order to receive compen-
sation from the Fund, it took private property (the right to sue the
airlines under state tort law for injuries that had already occurred) for
public use (to protect vital national infrastructure). Due process
therefore would require the government to provide "just compensa-
tion."' 42 Just compensation would be the fair market value of the con-
fiscated chose in action-the expected value of litigating to a
judgment.43 Therefore, under the takings view, compensation from
the Fund should be based on the same principles as tort damages. 44
Proponents of the victim compensation program deployed takings ar-
insurance, and to stabilize the market for such insurance through government guarantees and
regulation. TRIA, supra note 14.
41. The problem of how to draw the line between the September llth victims and other tort
victims who go without recovery is discussed below. See infra notes 92-102 and accompanying
text.
42. See Joan Bernott Maginnis, The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund: Overview and Comment,
Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, at 4, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/
Publications/Terrorism/VictimFund.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2002) (arguing that ATSA's limita-
tion on the ability to sue may constitute an uncompensated taking); See also Colaio, 262 F. Supp.
2d at 300 (rejecting plaintiffs' claim that the Special Master's regulations were a violation of their
rights to full compensation under ATSA: plaintiffs did not argue that the retroactive limitation
on liability violated due process).
43. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes
and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989).
44. Those who suffered property damage also suffered a taking-their suits too were limited
to the amount of insurance-but the Fund was limited to claims based on personal injuries or




guments in the nonpublic discussions that led to the creation of the
program. 45
B. Alternatives to the Tort Model
There are other possible ways of perceiving the events than the tort
model, however.
The fiery collapse of the World Trade Center might be seen as a
kind of natural disaster that no one could foresee or protect against.
In this conception, the purpose of a victim's compensation program
would be the same as other federal disaster relief-to help the victims
or their survivors get through the calamity and back on their feet.
One might also view the attacks as an act of war waged against civil-
ians and the U.S. economic system by "enemy combatants," as the
President repeatedly suggested both before and after the war on Iraq.
Military casualties of war receive only modest payments, however,
and civilian casualties normally receive no government compensation
(other than ordinary employee benefits, if applicable).
Alternatively, such events might be seen as an unavoidable risk of
life in early twenty-first century America, a risk that, because it is re-
lated to the national government's foreign policy, the federal govern-
ment should insure against.
Or the attacks might be viewed as acts directed symbolically against
the entire country and its government, making the victims emblematic
surrogates for all Americans. On this view, the expressive content of
the act might call for an expressive act of national generosity toward
the victims, who should be treated differently from other victims of
torts, crimes, or disasters as a way of showing defiance to the perpe-
trators-in the words of one commentator, "to serve as a national ex-
pression of unity in the face of a tragedy unique in American history,
as well as to help survivors."'46
C. Procedural Implications of Differing Conceptions of the
Purposes of Compensation
In this section I discuss the procedural implications of these differ-
ent views of the nature of the victims' losses and the purpose of com-
pensating them.
45. Conversation with Robert Peck, Senior Director for Legal Affairs and Policy Research,
Association of Trial Lawyers of America (Apr. 24, 2003). Whatever the merits of the takings
argument as applied to the September llth program, however, it would not apply to legislation
prospectively creating an exclusive federal cause of action governed by federal law and with
federal remedies to apply to harms caused by terrorist acts committed in the future.
46. Michael I. Meyerson, Losses of Equal Value, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, at D4.
2003]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
1. Tort Litigation and Settlement
The model that is implicit in the statute is tort litigation, which is the
usual means of obtaining compensation for personal injuries caused
by intentional or negligent acts. Tort litigation follows as a matter of
course when airplanes fall out of the sky or crash into things and when
buildings fall down. This is true even when the events occur as a re-
sult of terrorist acts. For example, private litigation over the Lock-
erbie crash resulted in payments by the airline of over $500 million,47
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing resulted in 500 lawsuits,48 and
there was litigation against the federal government over the
Oklahoma City bombing.49 In this case it was almost certain that law-
suits would be filed against the airlines, the architects of the World
Trade Center, the Port Authority, and others whose negligence, it
would be argued, made the attacks possible and the damage more
catastrophic.50
Such lawsuits would not be especially difficult for courts to handle.
Personal injury claims would have involved no more than about 3000
individuals. Joinder, joint representation, and consolidation and
transfer would have aggregated the claims into a relatively small num-
ber of litigations that would resemble other mass accident cases.
Property damage cases, particularly as the factual and legal theories
became more attenuated, would be more difficult to manage, but
many procedural mechanisms, including new statutory tools, exist to
make such litigation feasible. For example, the Multiparty, Mul-
tiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 grants the federal courts original
jurisdiction over single-event accidents in which more than seventy-
five natural persons have died and in which there is minimal diver-
47. See Amanda Ripley, CNN, What Is a Life Worth? (Feb. 4, 2002), available at
www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/2002/02/ll/life.html; see also Ronald Sullivan, Court Up-
holds Pan Am 103 Awards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1. 1994, at D2.
48. Jensen Brenner Floor Statement on Litigation Management Provisions in Terrorism Insur-
ance Bill, U.S. House of Rep. Comm. on Judiciary (Nov. 29, 2001), available at http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/news_112901.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
49. Victims Fight Over Lawsuit, DENVER POST, Mar. 20, 1997, available at http://63.147.65.175/
bomb/bomb63.htm; CNN, Oklahoma Bombing Victims To Sue Government Agencies (Mar. 19,
1997), available at http://www.cnn.comiUS/9703/19/okc.bomb/index.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2003).
50. See generally Mulligan v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 02 Civ. 6885, 2002 WL 31008974
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2002) (order permitting plaintiffs to sue Port Authority but leave litigation
"dormant" and thus not waive ability to claim against the Victim Compensation Fund); James
Glanz & Eric Lipton, Expert Report Disputes U.S. on Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at B1;
Greg Barrett, Fireproofing Deficient on World Trade Center, Says Architect, LAFAYETTE J. &
COURIER, Sept. 12, 2002; Nadine Post, No Reasonable Precautions Could Have Prevented Col-
lapses, ENG'G NEws-REC., Apr. 8, 2002.
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sity. 5t This statute also permits consolidation of all cases into one
court through removal of actions filed in state court52 and multidistrict
litigation treatment.5 3 The Act was designed to streamline litigation
of mass accident cases generally, but it would apply equally to single-
event acts of terrorism such as the September 11th attacks. More
sweeping procedural innovations are also possible. For example, the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA)54 provides for an exclu-
sive federal cause of action for property damage, personal injury, or
death resulting from an act of terrorism, 55 consolidates all cases into a
single federal court 56 with nationwide jurisdiction,57 and provides for
the application of a single substantive law. 58 These litigation manage-
ment provisions could permit consolidated, streamlined litigation for
losses from terrorist acts.
The factors limiting the use of the tort system in terrorism cases
thus are not procedural, but rather include substantive law, defend-
ants' financial ability to respond, the broader economic impact of po-
tential or actual liability on corporations, industries, and markets, and
public policy.
In any event, a fundamental premise of the Fund was that the air-
lines should be relieved of liability in excess of their insurance cover-
age. Because tort litigation could be anticipated and was within the
capability of the court system, the need to persuade potential plaintiffs
to opt out of the tort system provided another reason to make com-
pensation under the Fund comparable to what claimants would expect
to receive through litigation. The analogy to tort litigation and settle-
ment affects procedural as well as remedial characteristics of the
Fund.
51. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
273, § 11,020, 116 Stat. 1758 (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1369 (West Supp. 2003)).
52. Because there is original federal court jurisdiction under § 1369, the actions can be re-
moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000).
53. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1407 (West Supp. 2003).
54. TRIA, supra note 14.
55. Id. § 107(a)(1). All state causes of action except those against the terrorists or their ac-
complices are preempted. Id. § 107(a)(2), (b).
56. Id. § 107(a)(4).
57. See id.
58. Id. § 107(a)(3). This seems to leave a gap: an act that occurs abroad against an American
air carrier, vessel, or mission is expressly included in the definition of an act of terrorism, but
since it did not occur in any state, section 107(a)(3) does not provide substantive law. Perhaps




a. Procedural Consequences of the Tort Model
The adoption of the tort model-even though the government was
substituted as the payor and fault was eliminated from the calcula-
tion-encouraged the claimants and the public to think of the process
as a version of tort settlement and to expect that the victims were
entitled to large awards. 59 Statutory language directed the Special
Master to determine "the extent of the harm to the claimant, includ-
ing any economic and noneconomic losses" and then to determine the
amount of compensation "based on the harm to the claimant, the facts
of the claim, and the individual circumstances of the claimant," 60 and
the implementing regulations based recovery primarily on lost in-
come. These regulations added to the expectation of large awards.
Many victims were extremely high earners, and their families' argu-
ments for multi-million dollar awards based on tort principles received
sympathetic media attention. Additionally, the media, particularly the
New York Times through its "Portraits of Grief" feature, focused at-
tention on each of the individual victims and their families, adding to
the sense that victims should be treated individually.
Thus far, the average award for deceased claimants has been $1.8
million, with awards as high as $6.9 million.61 Victim advocates, led by
the financial services firm Cantor Fitzgerald, which lost 658 employees
in the World Trade Center collapse, have argued that awards should
be even higher-as much as $20 million or more for very high-income
decedents.
The provision for an individualized measure of damages based on
traditional tort criteria that included elements like pain and suffering
and lost income was the source of the most significant issues for pro-
cedural design with respect to the September 11th Fund. Individual-
ized awards must be based on individualized evidence, and on the
exercise of judgment through some form of individualized adjudica-
tion. The Special Master could devise rules of evidence to limit and
define the types of evidence that could be offered and the weight it
would be given, but his freedom in this regard was constrained by the
tort-like measure of damages. Because the statute commanded him to
59. Thus far the Fund has made awards totaling some $3 billion. The total cost of the com-
pensation program is variously estimated at between $4-6 billion. See Chen, supra note 37 ($4-5
billion); Belkin, supra note 17 ($6 billion). Public perception of the size of tort awards is skewed,
as media coverage tends to overrepresent plaintiff's verdicts, large verdicts, and punitive damage
awards, and tends to underrepresent later reductions of awards by trial judges and reversals by
appellate courts. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DECEASED VICTIMS, supra note 3.
60. ATSA, supra note 1, § 405(b)(1). Punitive damages were excluded. Id. § 405(b)(5).
61. See supra note 3.
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determine "economic and noneconomic losses" and to base the award
on that determination, lost future income had to be part of the
proceedings.62
Even if Congress did not have the time to give much consideration
to whether it wanted to replicate tort damages or to set up a system
that could successfully compete with the tort system on economic
grounds, by the time the Special Master was promulgating regulations
he knew that it was important to convince claimants that they should
choose the Fund rather than tort remedies. If lost income was a com-
ponent (and in most cases, the largest component) of the award, that
meant expert testimony and the potential for contested issues regard-
ing methodology and assumptions. In turn, inclusion of such issues
meant that lay people would feel they required legal representation,
that the proceedings would be complex and technical, and that the
Special Master would have to take steps to maintain consistency
among claimants.
Individualized determination of noneconomic damages such as pain
and suffering would have made the proceedings even more complex,
as well as more traumatic, for claimants and the public. The Special
Master eliminated this factor by setting noneconomic damages at a
standard amount based on the number of dependents. 63 This depar-
ture from individualized adjudications was defensible, as it was consis-
tent with state statutes setting caps on noneconomic damages, and
with the statutory language referring to the "individual circum-
stances" of the claimants. The decision also allowed the Special
Master to sidestep controversy over determinations that would inevi-
tably involve a significant measure of speculation, and to avoid the
awkwardness of the government valuing the suffering of one victim
differently from that of another. As might have been expected, the
decision to cap noneconomic damages was strongly criticized, 64 but
most of the controversy over the awards has focused on the methodol-
ogy for determining lost income.
Complex proceedings are more costly both for claimants and for the
adjudicator, as well as more time-consuming. The cost to claimants
was held down for September 11th claimants by the plaintiff's bar's
generous response in providing pro bono representation, though many
claimants retained their own attorneys on a contingent-fee basis. We
62. In Colaio v. Feinberg, the district court held that it was within the Special Master's discre-
tion not to base the awards solely on economic and noneconomic losses and not to award com-
pensation equal to tort damages. Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
63. See 28 C.F.R. §104.44 (2002); Appendix, subpart II(C)(2)(a).
64. The regulation was upheld in Colaio, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 287.
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cannot assume, however, that tort lawyers would agree to provide rep-
resentation gratis for all future victims of terrorism. If individualized
determinations based on complex expert evidence are part of the sys-
tem, claimants will need representation to develop and present the
evidence necessary to prove their claims. If lawyers do not continue
to donate their services, these costs will become part of the system and
will result either in higher costs to the government or lower net recov-
eries by claimants.
The time required to process awards has also been significant. In
April 2003, some nineteen months after the Fund was established,
only 236 awards had been completed. 65 By November 2003, only
1,890 death claims had been filed, representing less than sixty-five per-
cent of the 2,976 who were killed, and only about half of the expected
3,000 injury claims had been filed. 66 Meanwhile, 1,700 lawsuits had
been filed. 67 Indeed, there was such concern that hundreds or even
thousands of people might miss the deadlines for filing both Septem-
ber 11th Fund claims and lawsuits and be left completely without com-
pensation that the New York congressional delegation sought to have
the statutory deadline for filing claims with the Fund extended for
another year, to December 31, 2004.68 In the last days and hours
before the filing period expired, however, claims came flooding in.
Eventually ninety-seven percent of eligible families filed claims.69
One-third of the 2884 death claims and more than half of the 4185
injury claims were filed in December 2003.70 In the end, only thirty-
nine families elected to file lawsuits, and only about fifty families did
not seek either form of compensation. 71 Special Master Feinberg esti-
mated that the claims administration process would conclude in June
2004.72
In short, the necessity to make individualized determinations of
"harm" or "losses" was at odds with Congress's intention that the
65. As of April 17, 2003, nineteen months after the Fund's creation, 593 claims had been
submitted, 370 award letters issued, 236 awards accepted, and 53 hearings requested. See http://
www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments-deceased.html (visited Apr. 17, 2003); http://
www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments-injury.html (visited Apr. 17, 2003) (data updated
periodically). In some cases, multiple claims were submitted in respect of one victim.
66. Daniel Wise, 9/11 Fund Gains Trust Among Injured, Families, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 2003.
67. Id.
68. David W. Chen, As Deadline for 9/11 Aid Nears, Many Relatives Haven't Filed, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, at Al.
69. David W. Chen, Man Behind Sept. 11 Fund Describes Effort as a Success, with Reserva-






Fund would provide immediate compensation to claimants, and with
its desire to eliminate the costs and delays of litigation.
b. Procedural Advantages of the Tort Settlement Model
Though it was understandable that the drafters of ATSA employed
the tort model when they constructed a program to provide compen-
sation to the victims of September 11th, there are important concep-
tual differences between the purposes and values of victim
compensation and tort settlement. These differences lead to both pro-
cedural advantages and procedural drawbacks in using tort settlement
claims administration as a model for future victim compensation
programs.
The most obvious difference is that by substituting the government
as payor and declaring that claims could be filed on behalf of all those
who were injured or killed as a result of the September 11th terrorist-
related plane crashes, ATSA completely eliminated the issues that
constitute the liability phase of tort litigation. Payments are not based
on the government's own liability in tort. The government's conduct
is not an issue-and neither, in most cases, is anyone else's, including
the terrorists, the airlines, and the premises owners and operators. To
establish the claimant's eligibility-the equivalent to the liability
phase in a tort suit-all that is necessary is to show that the claimant's
loss was caused by or sufficiently related to an act that is within the
definition of a "terrorist attack. '73 Whether the event qualifies as a
"terrorist attack" may be determined, as in other legislation passed
after September llth, 74 legislatively or by the executive branch, and
often there will be no significant causation issues. For example, causa-
tion was clear in the deaths from the airplane crashes and building
collapses. If later-manifesting injuries were at issue, such as respira-
tory injuries to rescue workers at the World Trade Center, or a chemi-
cal, biological, or "dirty bomb" attack, causation could become a
factor.
Similarly, in the circumstances of September 11th, there was no real
need for testimony of percipient witnesses, except to the extent neces-
sary to establish the claimant's presence at the scene. The contested
73. Eligible losses are limited to personal injury or death suffered at the crash sites or aboard
the airplanes, at the time of, or in the immediate aftermath of, the crashes.
74. See, e.g., TRIA, supra note 14. TRIA defines an act of terrorism as an act certified by the
Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of State, and Attorney General as meeting certain specified
criteria. TRIA, supra note 14, § 102(1)(A)(i)-(iv). Interestingly, the Oklahoma City bombing
would not have qualified under TRIA, because it was not committed on behalf of a "foreign
person or foreign interest." Id. § 102(1)(A)(iv).
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parts of the case only involve the computation of the award. For this,
medical, actuarial, and other expert testimony is likely to be
determinative.
The mass tort settlement model offers several procedural advan-
tages. Appointing a special master to administer the program each
time there is a triggering event avoids the need to create, staff, and
fund an ongoing administrative body which, because terrorist attacks
may occur infrequently, may not be needed for long periods of time or
to fold the victim compensation program into an existing administra-
tive structure designed to solve different problems.
Unlike adjudication in court, mass tort settlement claims adminis-
tration does not create precedent and does not have to follow rules of
general application. The claims procedures, as well as the substantive
rules of decision, can be tailored to the needs of the particular case.
Similarly, the procedural needs and substantive rules of a fund for
those who were killed or injured in the planes or on the ground on
September 11th could be very different from those for a fund set up to
compensate people injured by a biological attack on a water supply or
a "dirty bomb" detonated in a population center.
It is often argued that the ad hoc nature of a settlement model
might promote speedier dispositions and lower costs. The slow pace
of the September 11th claims administration may seem to run counter
to this assumption. However, the Special Master had to create proce-
dures and promulgate regulations from scratch, as well as overcome
claimants' uncertainties about whether to opt into the Fund. In this
effort, he met with over 1,000 families. These obstacles presumably
would not be present in a system that is put in place before terrorist
attacks occur. The tort claims administration model could permit de-
grees or gradations of adjudication through such mechanisms as pre-
sumptive levels of compensation, grids, and caps, all of which are
common in mass tort settlements.
The September 11th Fund utilized all of these simplifying or stan-
dardizing devices. Such procedures could make outcomes more con-
sistent and reduce administrative and claimant costs by limiting the
number of issues that could be contested and standardizing awards.
Moreover, placing all determinations under the authority of a single
appointed master may bring a degree of consistency that is hard to
achieve in atomistic individual litigation. All of these procedures un-
dercut the individualized calculation of actual harm that is the premise
of tort damages, but these inroads have become commonplace in mass
tort settlements, and they may therefore seem less objectionable when
the procedures are transplanted to the victim compensation context.
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One might also argue that the special master model would allow the
program to obtain the advantages of flexibility, efficiency, and adjudi-
cative discretion while retaining the aura of legitimacy and authority
that attaches to judgments of courts-or so it might seem if one does
not think too hard about the kind of authority a special master can
possibly have when the appointment is not made and supervised by a
court. In that context the "special master" looks more like an admin-
istrative law judge.
Some of these advantages may not be as benign as they first seem.
In creating procedures for administering settlements of private litiga-
tion, precedent is not needed because the settlement is (at least no-
tionally) based on consensual resolution of a particular case. 75 There
is no need for rules of general application, and consistency can be
achieved within the claimant group by other methods, such as grids.
Nor is an ongoing bureaucracy or a full-service set of procedural rules
necessary because the procedures can be tailored to the needs of the
particular case and are adopted by consent. Judicial review is not re-
quired, because the administrator's discretion is limited by the consent
of the parties and the documents creating the claims facility have been
approved by a court. When the program is run by the government
and may be used in a variety of different factual contexts, however,
discarding precedent, rules of general applicability, and judicial review
may be less benign.
c. Drawbacks of the Mass Tort Settlement Model
The option of filing a claim with the September 11th Fund offered
claimants at least one important advantage over tort litigation that is
not often discussed. Eligibility for compensation depends solely on
whether the victim was injured or killed on September 11th as a result
of the attacks. Claimants do not need to prove liability or causation. 76
If claimants meet the straightforward criteria for eligibility, they are
entitled to recover their economic and noneconomic losses. 77 More-
75. In the case of class action litigation, the notion that settlements derive legitimacy from the
knowing consent of the parties is somewhat fictional because consent is given by class counsel,
there are serious practical limitations on the ability to withhold consent by opting out, and there
may be conflicts of interest between class counsel and absent members of the class.
76. "[T]he Special Master shall not consider negligence or any other theory of liability."
ATSA, supra note 1, § 405(b)(2).
77. The statute does not literally require that the award be equal to the economic and
noneconomic losses suffered by the claimant. The Special Master is required to determine the
amount of those losses, and then to determine the amount of compensation "based on the harm
to the claimant, the facts of the claim, and the individual circumstances of the claimant." Id.
§ 405(b)(1). The statute arguably allows the Special Master to deviate from the full amount of
the harm by such measures as valuing pain and suffering at a set amount, setting awards at a
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over, the awards are not reduced by attorneys fees or taxes. Because
skilled attorneys are providing legal representation pro bono, claim-
ants net the full amount of the award (less expenses),78 and because
the federal government pays the award, there is no risk that the award
will not be enforceable. The entire award is paid immediately in a
lump sum and is tax-free. Congress has also exempted September
11th victims and their families from both income and estate taxes. 79
By contrast, tort plaintiffs must prove liability, bear the risk that the
jury may find against them in the liability phase, pay attorneys fees
from any recovery (unless unusual circumstances permit fee-shifting),
and enforce the judgment. In standard economic theory, the expected
value to a plaintiff of a tort claim is the amount of the judgment if a
plaintiff prevails, discounted by the risk of a defendant's verdict, and
reduced by the costs of litigating to judgment. Passengers aboard the
airplanes would probably be able to establish liability 80 and might ex-
pect to receive large judgments,8' but plaintiffs on the ground could
designated percentage of actual harm, or making sliding-scale adjustments based on factors such
as income level or family size. See Statement of the Special Master Regarding the Progress of
the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcom-
pensation/spstatement.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2003). For the sake of clarity, I will refer to
awards as based on or equal to the actual economic and noneconomic losses; the simplification
does not affect the analysis.
78. In the preamble to the Interim Final Rule, the Special Master emphasized the fact that
"the Fund is a no-fault, administrative scheme that should not involve the kind of risks and
expense that would justify any significant attorneys fee," and warned that "contingency arrange-
ments in excess of 5% of a claimant's recovery from the Fund would not be in the best interests
of the claimants." 66 Fed. Reg. 66,280 (Dec. 21, 2001).
79. Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-134, 115 Stat. 2427 (2002)
(codified at 26 U.S.C.A. §692(c), (d) (West Supp. 2003)).
80. Airline liability for crashes is virtually absolute. Even the victims in the crash of Pan Am
Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, which was caused by a bomb carried aboard by Libyan
terrorists, were able to recover $500 million from the airline and its insurers. See infra note 81.
81. Recoveries for families of passengers killed in airplane crashes are usually substantial. See
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/2002/02/11/life.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2003)
In 25 major aviation accidents between 1970 and 1984, the average compensation for
victims who went to trial was $1 million in current dollars, according to a RAND Corp.
analysis. Average compensation for cases settled without a lawsuit was $415,000. The
biggest aviation payout in history followed the crash of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lock-
erbie, Scotland, in 1988. Settlements ranged all over the spectrum, with a couple dozen
exceeding $10 million, according to Manhattan attorney Lee Kreindler, who acted as
lead counsel. Dividing the total $500 million payout over the 270 victims yields an
average award of $1.85 million. However, the families had to hand about a third of
their awards to their lawyers, and they waited seven to eight years to see any money.
Id. According to this source, average recoveries of passengers after trial were less in current
dollars than the average awards to date from the Fund, and even the recoveries in "the biggest
aviation payout in history" averaged about the same as the awards from the Fund-before de-
ducting the one-third contingency fees the tort plaintiffs had to pay. Id. But see Roger Parloff,
Tortageddon-Why the September 11 Victims' Fund Could Become a Template for Mass Tort
Reform, AM. LAW, Mar. 2002, at 14 (quoting Kreindler as noting that "it is not even clear that
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face substantial obstacles to proving liability and causation, 82 and the
expected value of their tort claims would have to be discounted for
the risk of nonrecovery. Attorney fees would amount to a substantial
percentage of any tort recovery. As Congress recognized, successful
tort claims could bankrupt the defendants, which would make many
judgments uncollectable-particularly in light of ATSA's limitation of
aggregate tort liability to the amount of the insurance coverage on the
four airplanes. And the portion of the recovery that represented lost
income would be taxable. Finally, litigation to judgment can take
years; the Lockerbie plaintiffs waited over seven years after the crash
to be paid.
Thus, the elimination of liability issues, the substitution of the fed-
eral government as payor, the availability of top-notch pro bono attor-
neys, and exemption from federal taxes make the expected value of
claims against the Fund attractive as compared to tort litigation, even
with the limits on pain and suffering and the ban on punitive damages.
The Victim Compensation Fund appears to be a better deal for claim-
ants than some have supposed.
Perceptions of the comparison between awards from the Fund and
potential recoveries through tort litigation, however, on the part of
both claimants and the public, have been framed by comparing actual,
tax-free, guaranteed awards from the Fund with hypothetical judg-
ments for successful tort claimants, before deducting attorneys fees,
costs of litigation, or taxes. The fact that claimants did not have to
prove liability, pay for lawyers, wait years for their payments, or run
the risk that the defendants would run out of money should, in theory,
have meant that awards could be set at the present expected value of
tort claims, which would be substantially less than the full amount of
economic and noneconomic losses. These subtleties have been largely
lost in the public discussion. Some have strongly criticized the Special
Master, and the formulas for awarding compensation, for providing
too little to claimants compared to the potential recoveries for suc-
cessful tort plaintiffs in litigation.83 For example, a prominent aviation
the plastic and ceramic knives and box-cutters used by the terrorists violated Federal Aviation
Administration regulations in effect at the time").
82. For example, such extensive destruction on the ground may have been unforeseeable to
the airlines; the architects may not have been negligent in failing to design the buildings to
withstand the impact and explosion of a big plane loaded with jet fuel; the Port Authority may
not have been negligent; telling people in the South Tower it was safe to return to work did not
affect the injuries of people in the North Tower, or of those who had not already escaped from
the South Tower.
83. The firm of Cantor Fitzgerald, which lost 658 employees in the World Trade Center col-
lapse, issued a report in September 2002 criticizing the awards for being too low. Several months
later, several Cantor Fitzgerald families sued the Special Master, the Attorney General, and the
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lawyer who represented 350 families called the presumed awards
"grossly unfair" and "so harsh as to be confiscatory. '84 But even mea-
sured against tort judgments after trial, average awards under the
Fund seem to be comparable to average gross awards for successful
tort plaintiffs, even before deducting attorney fees.85 By the same to-
ken, setting awards at the gross value of a potential tort judgment,
rather than the expected value of litigating to judgment, makes the
program more costly to the taxpayers than it would need to be if the
only consideration were to provide a comparable alternative to tort
litigation.8 6
From the claimants' perspective, both mass tort settlements and the
September 11th Fund tended to flatten out differences in outcomes,
eliminating the very high awards that some tort plaintiffs would re-
ceive after trial and giving more to the less seriously injured. The fam-
ilies of high-earning decedents have strongly criticized the Fund's
regulations for cutting off the lost-income tables at a yearly income of
$231,000 and cautioning that awards are not likely to exceed approxi-
mately $6 million. A significant number of those killed at the World
Trade Center earned more than $1 million a year and would have re-
ceived much higher awards if lost income calculations were based on
their actual income.87
Department of Justice, challenging the rules of the Fund and the formulas for determining
awards, and seeking certification of a class comprised of the 2800 people who died at the World
Trade Center. See Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (granting motion for
judgment on the pleadings).
84. See Jennifer Barrett, Arbitrary and Inappropriate, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 2002, Newsweek
Web Exclusive, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Newsweek File (quoting Lee Kreindler); Parloff, supra
note 81, at 14.
85. See supra note 81.
86. On the other hand, juries might choose to disregard weaknesses in the liability case in
order to compensate sympathetic plaintiffs-and who could be more sympathetic than the vic-
tims of a terrorist attack? In theory, the government would not have to offer very much in order
to get plaintiffs with difficult liability cases to opt out of the tort system. In practice, the likeli-
hood of a plaintiffs' verdict would be higher than the strength of the legal claim might suggest,
and plaintiffs might have many noneconomic incentives to sue rather than to accept a small
payment.
87. Awards are also reduced below potential tort judgments by the statute's command that
collateral source payments such as life insurance proceeds should be offset against the presump-
tive amount of awards. Very high income victims are more likely to carry large amounts of life
insurance; indeed, many high income claimants' awards would have been completely offset by
life insurance, had not the Special Master used his discretion to award a minimum payment of
$250,000 even to these claimants. Because the collateral source offset is contained in the statu-
tory language rather than the regulations, it has not received as much criticism during the claims
administration process.
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d. Fairness and the Tort Litigation Model
From a procedural perspective, there is a more basic flaw in using a
tort litigation model to design victim compensation programs. The
most fundamental procedural value is fairness. In their natural
habitat, the fairness of tort damages is supported by a host of princi-
ples-economic (risk-creators should internalize the costs of their
risky activities, risk-creating enterprises are more efficient cost-bear-
ers), moral (harms should be borne by blameworthy actors rather than
by innocent bystanders), and pragmatic (the specter of jury awards for
compensatory and punitive damages deters unreasonably risky con-
duct)-that point to individualized damages based on actual harm.88
When the government pays, however, individualized compensation
based on tort measures may no longer appear fair.
The underlying principle of individualized determinations of tort
damages is that the wrongdoer is responsible for putting victims back
in the position they would have occupied but for the wrongful act. In
the case of injury or death, this principle means compensation for lost
future income as well as special damages and pain and suffering. The
tort system's legitimacy is based on the fact that damages determina-
tions are individualized. Victims of the same tort (e.g., negligent
maintenance of the sidewalk leading to a slip and fall) may receive
different amounts based on factors such as their income. This process
is considered legitimate because it forces the defendant to internalize
the costs of risk creation and compensates each plaintiff for the mar-
ket value of his or her loss.
But when the federal government is not -a tortfeasor but pays out
money anyway, then the competing principle is equality-all persons
are created equal, one person one vote, equal justice under law. This
principle points to a remedy that values all persons equally, without
regard to their wealth, status, class, race, ethnicity, or gender. Such a
principle could be expressed in payments that are equal for all victims,
payments based on need (taking into account such factors as wealth,
age, number of dependants, and collateral source payments), or a hy-
brid of the two. For example, claimants could receive medical care
and reimbursement of medical expenses, perhaps administratively
through an agency or by including them in military or government
employee health plans or Medicare, plus a set amount based on the
severity of the injury.
88. Punitive damages are an exception, but even punitives are supposed to be individualized




What is not acceptable under the equality principle is a system that
makes it appear that the national government places a higher value on
the lives of wealthy people than those of poor people. As time went
by, criticisms of the Fund based on perceived violations of the equality
principle became more insistent. In the words of one journalist:
How did the government get into the business of saying that one
victim's life is worth three times as much as another's? Or that the
grief of these families is worth millions, while the grief of other
crime victims, or accident victims, or even other terror victims, is
not? .. . Should an emissary with unlimited taxpayer funds-cur-
rent projections put the cost as high as $6 billion-have such power
over people's lives at all?89
If the government, rather than the tortfeasor, is paying, then the
rationales of cost internalization and deterrence are no longer present.
The federal government did not create the risk or cause the harm, so
there is nothing to internalize and nothing to deter. Indeed, to the
extent that the Fund replaces tort litigation over the airlines', archi-
tects', or Port Authority's negligence, it could even undermine the tort
goals of deterrence and internalization of costs. When the govern-
ment is a volunteer, there is no particular rationale for adopting tort
damages as the measure of the award.
Thus, making individualized tort damages, calculated primarily on
the basis of income and wealth, the measure of compensation paid by
the national government to victims who died together in the same ter-
rorist attack is inconsistent with the fundamental principle in a democ-
racy that, to the government, at least, all persons have equal value. It
has even been called "un-American." 90 Special Master Feinberg him-
self has called attention to this seeming unfairness:
If I were writing the program today-and I don't fault Congress;
they were acting under the gun-I would have clarified the public-
policy foundation.... Is it tort or is it social welfare? And I'd think
long and hard about this: Is a flat sum better than variations? I
think perhaps it might be.91
89. Belkin, supra note 17, at 92.
90. See Julie Kosterlitz, Who Counts?, NAT'L J., May 4, 2002, at 1296 (The terrorists didn't
choose their victims based on income. "For the federal government to say that the person whose
dishes were washed at the World Trade Center will get a higher taxpayer-funded contribution
than the person who did the washing of the dishes-I think that is un-American.") (quoting
Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating).
91. Belkin, supra note 17; see also Statement of the Special Master Regarding the Progress of
the September l1th Victim Compensation Fund, supra note 77 ("While I appreciate such argu-
ments, disparities among awards are unavoidable here because the statute creating the Fund
expressly requires that I consider the claimant's 'economic loss.' ... I had no choice but to make
income one of the many individual circumstances that I consider in making awards.").
[Vol. 53:627
PROCEDURAL DESIGN
Another aspect of the fairness problem appears when we return to
one of the foundational questions of procedural design discussed
above: What distinguishes the beneficiaries of this program from
other similarly situated persons and requires us to treat them differ-
ently? The September 11th program, precisely because it was an ad
hoc response to the events of a single terrible day, has been criticized
for failing this basic test of fairness.
Were these claimants singled out because they were victims of hei-
nous acts who cannot recover through the tort system? Then what
about victims of violent crimes, who usually do not recover damages
from the perpetrator? 92
Is it because they were victims of terrorism? Then what about the
victims of the Oklahoma City bombing, 93 the Beltway snipers, or the
Unabomber-or Orlando Letelier and Randi Moffatt, who were
killed by a car bomb in Washington, D.C. in 1976 by agents of the
Chilean secret police? 94 The federal government's only compensation
to victims of the Oklahoma City bombing, aside from paying ordinary
employee benefits for the victims who were federal employees, was to
give $75,000 to the state crime victims restitution program. 95
Is it because they were victims of foreign terrorists? What about
the first World Trade Center bombing, the Lockerbie crash, the em-
bassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, 96 the bombing of the military
barracks in Lebanon? None of these victims received government
compensation, though the Lockerbie plaintiffs did eventually recover
92. Typically the perpetrators, if they are caught, have no assets. State funds for compensat-
ing crime victims are not well funded and cannot provide payments on the scale of tort damages.
93. Senator Don Nickles argued as early as September 20, 2001, during the last-minute negoti-
ations that resulted in the bill that became ATSA, that the federal government should not pro-
vide compensation for the September 11th victims without also compensating those killed or
injured in the Oklahoma City bombing. Kosterlitz, supra note 90.
94. See JOHN DINGES & SAUL LANDAU, ASSASSINATION ON EMBASSY Row (1980). Family
members of Letelier and Moffatt filed a civil suit against the government of Chile, the Chilean
secret police, and nine individuals, obtaining a settlement from the government of Chile after its
transition to democracy. See http://www.tni.orglletelier/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2003).
95. See Oklahomans Questioning Sept. 11 Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, at B8. In addition,
about $35 million in private charitable contributions were made, mostly to the American Red
Cross, although not all of those funds were paid to the bombing victims. Associated Press, A
Nation Challenged: The Victims; Oklahomans Questioning Sept. 11 Aid, N.Y. TIMES, DEC. 23,
2001, at B8.
96. In May 2002, the House voted to include the victims of the embassy bombings in the
September l1th Fund. See Embassy Employee Compensation Act, H.R. 3375, 107th Cong.
(2002). It languished in committee in the Senate. See http:/lthomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/




from Pan Am. Indeed, what about the anthrax attacks through the
postal system?
97
Is it because these were "acts of war," as the President has said?
Then what about civilian losses in the attack on Pearl Harbor and re-
porters in Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and other War zones?
Even if it is because they were victims of the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, what about those who suffered property damage
or the rescue workers who were seriously injured by working for
months under tons of burning rubble and breathing dust, smoke, ash,
and noxious fumes?98
When the government decides to break with the usual social prac-
tice that tort victims who cannot find solvent defendants to sue and
people injured by terrorists or acts of war must bear their own losses,
it will naturally face challenges based on line-drawing arguments. In-
deed, there have already been efforts to extend the coverage of ATSA
to victims of the Oklahoma City bombing, the first World Trade
Center attack, and other similar events. 99 Congress itself passed legis-
lation less than two months after ATSA was enacted, directing the
President to submit, by the time of the submission of the fiscal year
2003 budget, a legislative proposal "to establish a comprehensive pro-
gram to ensure fair; equitable, and prompt compensation for all
United States victims of international terrorism" from November 1,
1979 forward.100
The larger the payments from victim compensation programs, the
more troubling and even indefensible such disparate treatment will
seem, particularly if the rationale appears to be compensation to the
claimants as tort victims. Awards from the Fund have averaged $1.8
97. Families of those killed in the anthrax attacks and the Oklahoma City bombing were in-
cluded in a bill, passed in January 2002, exempting September 11th victims from 2001 income
taxes. Kosterlitz, supra note 90.
98. Because of the statutory language, rescue workers who arrived on the scene more than
ninety-six hours after the attacks were not eligible for compensation. See ATSA, supra note 1,
§ 405(c); 67 Fed. Reg. 11,245, § 104.2(c)(1) (Mar. 13, 2002); Appendix, subpart II(C) infra.
99. See Belkin, supra note 17, at 92 (discussing Oklahoma City, embassy bombings, USS Cole,
first World Trade Center bombing, anthrax letters). In May 2002, the House passed legislation
to extend the benefits of the September 11th Fund to the embassy bombing victims, but that bill
has not been acted on by the Senate. Id.
100. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act, § 626(a)-(b), Pub. L. No. 107-77, 115 Stat. 748, 803 (2002). November 4, 1979
was the date that followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini overran the U.S. embassy in Tehran and
held fifty-two Americans hostage for 444 days. The statute was passed on November 15, 2001
and signed by the President on November 28, 2001. See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/
D?dl07:1:/temp/-bdslNb:@@@L&summ2=M&-/bss/dlO7query.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2003). Although the fiscal year 2003 budget proposal has been submitted, no proposal for a
comprehensive, retroactive victim compensation program has been made.
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million and have ranged as high as $7.9 million.' 0' The least defensi-
ble explanation for the difference in treatment is one that seems to
capture part of the truth of the September 11th Fund: "If your death
involves an industry that the government feels compelled to protect,
you're in luck. But if it is an industry that the government would let
go under, you are on your own."10 2
2. Act of War
President Bush began referring to the September 11th attacks as an
"act of war" just one day after they occurred. 0 3 His administration
has defended the many extraordinary measures suspending or ignor-
ing civil liberties that were adopted following the attacks as within the
President's war powers in response to such acts, 10 4 and this position
has been accepted by some courts105
The rhetorical trope of acts of war, however, does not get us very
far in designing a victim compensation program. Acts of war are com-
monly excluded from insurance policies covering both personal injury
and property damages, but the government does not normally provide
compensation for such injuries. Family members of military personnel
who are killed in combat receive a special payment of six thousand
dollars, three thousand of which is considered a "death gratuity" that
is tax-free, as well as other modest benefits.10 6
101. See http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments deceased.html (last visited Jan.
26, 2004) (data updated periodically); http://www.usdoj.gov/victimcompensation/payments-in-
jury.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2004) (data updated periodically).
102. See Belkin, supra note 17, at 92.
103. See Katharine Q. Seelye & Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Labels Aerial Terrorist Attacks
"Acts of War," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at A16.
104. See Anne E. Kornblut & Susan Milligan, An Emotional Bush Promises Victory, BOSTON
GLOBE, Sept. 14, 2001, at Al (quoting a close Bush associate as describing the President's speech
as declaring a "state of war").
105. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that detention, with-
out access to counsel, of American citizen captured as alleged enemy combatant in Afghanistan
was within President's war powers).
106. See Jacqueline L. Salmon, Military Families Bemoan Loss of Bill on Death Benefits,
WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 2003, at C7. The additional benefits include burial costs, monthly com-
pensation to the spouse and each child under eighteen health coverage, for the family, six
months of free housing or help with housing costs, a portion of the servicemember's retirement
pay, and an income tax break for at least one year. The value of these benefits does not re-
motely approach the amounts awarded under the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund.
Servicemembers can also purchase life insurance coverage of up to $250,000. Id. For a side-by-
side comparison of federal military and civilian employee death benefits, see infra note 107.
Servicemembers who were killed at the Pentagon on September 11th were also eligible for com-
pensation from the Fund and from the money donated to private charities for the September
11th victims.
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Civilian casualties and property damages from acts of war are ordi-
narily not compensated by the government. 10 7 Victims may be able to
sue the foreign government or individuals involved in U.S. courts,108
but significant recoveries are not usually obtained. Even if a judg-
ment is obtained, there may be no assets in the United States to satisfy
it, or the federal government may prohibit execution against frozen
assets.10 9 Sometimes when hostilities are concluded the foreign state
will be released from such claims. 110
In short, if terrorist attacks are really acts of war, then the usual
practice would be to let the losses lie where they fall. Recently, we
have seen daily television coverage of injuries and deaths of civilians
and military personnel through acts of war in Iraq. It is unlikely that
special federal benefits will be provided to them. The contrast be-
tween the television images of the military and civilian casualties of
the war in Iraq, who will not receive special compensation from the
U.S. government aside from these modest benefits, and the victims of
the September 11th attacks, who will receive tort-like damages in ad-
dition to funds from private charities, may make it less likely that
Congress will legislate so generously for future terrorist attacks.
Other countries, notably Israel and Britain, have had to deal on an
ongoing basis with civilian deaths from terrorist actions. These pro-
grams are functionally similar to government-paid terrorism insurance
for personal injury or death. They are discussed below in subpart
111(c)(4).
107. For a comparison of federal military and civilian death benefit programs, see http://
www.cpms.osd.millicuc/attacks/Death%20Benefits%20Chart.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003); see
also http://www.cpms.osd.millicuc/attacks/Death%20Benefits.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
108. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2000). The U.S. govern-
ment has itself paid compensation to foreign casualties of U.S. actions, such as the families of
those who were killed in the unintentional U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia, who
each received $1.5 million. See Belkin, supra note 17, at 17.
109. For example, President Bush signed an order on the first day of the second Gulf War
releasing $150 million in Iraqi assets in the United States that had been frozen since the first
Gulf War, so that they could be seized to satisfy judgments obtained by Americans who were
held captive and used as human shields in the first Gulf War. See Tom Schoenberg, Fights Loom
for Iraqui Riches, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 2, 2003, at 1. Cuban assets in the United States that have
been frozen for decades, and judgments may not be enforced against them. In an interesting
attempt to get around this ban, one judgment creditor attempted to attach an aircraft owned by
the Cuban government that was hijacked to Key West. Peter Page, Cuban Plane Sale a Symbolic
Victory, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 20, 2003, at A4.




Although the Bush administration has been referring to the events
of September 11, 2001 as "acts of war" since September 12, 2001,111
the public appears to regard terrorist acts on U.S. soil as natural disas-
ters rather than acts of war. For example, focus groups rejected a pro-
posed Homeland Security public relations slogan, "Be a soldier in
your own home," because "[t]hey did not like to think about a terror-
ist attack in terms of war ... but more as a disaster like a tornado or
earthquake that they could weather.' 12
The philosophy of disaster relief is to relieve immediate suffering,
get people back on their feet, and rebuild what was lost. The ex-
traordinary outpouring of $2 billion in donations to the American Red
Cross and to charities set up specifically to benefit those who suffered
losses was an expression of this impulse.11 3 Those who were consid-
ered especially deserving-the firefighters, police, and other rescue
workers who were seen as heroes because they voluntarily put them-
selves in harm's way to rescue others-were special objects of this
generosity. Funds earmarked solely for these public employees con-
stituted at least eighteen percent of the total contributions.
The disaster relief model has much to recommend it, particularly
because it is based on need and therefore is less subject to the criti-
cism that the government should not value the lives of the wealthy
more highly than other lives. Indeed, Special Master Feinberg and the
government have recently spoken of the purpose of the Fund in terms
that evoke the disaster-relief concept of getting people back on their
feet, as opposed to providing a replacement of the tort system.11 4
However, this focus on subsistence may result in a level of benefits
that is much lower than the public would have wanted for victims of
September 11th or other terrorist acts, at least in the immediate after-
math when the regulation was passed. Compensation under the disas-
ter model often depends heavily on property losses which could cause
a bias in favor of wealth and could probably be addressed more effi-
ciently -through regulation and support of the property and casualty
insurance market. Finally, delivery of services under the disaster re-
lief model has often been chaotic and plagued by delay.
111. See Seelye & Bumiller, supra note 103.
112. See Maureen Dowd, Ready or Not.... N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, § 4 (Week in Review),
at 11.
113. See Laura Hruby & Marni D. Larose, September 11 Donations: How Much Charities
Have Raised and Distributed, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 1, 2002, available at http://philan-
thropy.comlfree/update/2002/03/2002030101.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).




Another way to look at terrorist attacks is that at this historical mo-
ment they are a risk that people are subject to just because they live in
the United States. Just as there is a risk of earthquake in San Fran-
cisco or of pickpockets in crowded downtown areas, there is a statisti-
cally small risk of being a victim of a terrorist attack simply by being
in the United States, especially in or near large cities, landmarks, fi-
nancial centers, and other symbolic locations. From this perspective, a
government program to compensate victims of terrorist acts should be
essentially a form of government-provided, government-funded insur-
ance against the risk of terrorism.
Other countries have adopted this approach to victim compensa-
tion. Israel has a high incidence of injuries from terrorist attacks, and
it provides various government benefits to victims of terrorism.
Under the Israeli program, a citizen or resident of Israel who was in-
jured in Israel or abroad, or a non-Israeli who was injured in Israel by
hostile action (as certified by an authority appointed by the Ministry
of Defense), is eligible for benefits. These include financial benefits
during medical treatment if the person is unable to work, a monthly
disability benefit based on a designated civil service grade and scaled
according to the percentage of disability, and dependents' benefits for
widows and parents of persons who have died as the result of hostile
action equal to those paid to families of soldiers killed in action. They
also include noncash benefits such as medical treatment, vocational
rehabilitation, loans and grants for housing, assistance in purchasing
and maintaining a car, and personal services. Widows, orphans, and
bereaved parents are also entitled to receive vocational rehabilitation
and other noncash benefits.115 Benefits do not take the form of a
lump sum cash payment. 1 6
The Israeli program provides ongoing support and services to survi-
vors, but the benefits are modest and do not purport to be payments
in compensation for economic or noneconomic losses. Except for pro-
viding disability benefits equivalent to those for government workers
and survivors' benefits equal to those for soldiers killed in action, the
Israeli program does not attempt to replace lost future income. The
program reflects an attitude that considers injuries due to terrorist
acts as a relatively normal hazard of Israeli life, for which the govern-
ment should provide support and social services, but not compensa-
115. See Nat'l Ins. Inst. of Isr., at http://www.btl.gov.ilIEnglish/btl-indx.aspname=newbene-
fits/hostilities.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2003).
116. Claimants who have suffered 10-19% disabilities do receive a lump-sum payment in lieu
of the other benefits described. See id.
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tion. It is consistent with a society that has universal military service,
a socialized view of the relations among citizens and the government,
and that has considered itself to be essentially on a wartime footing
since its founding.
The British government also provides terrorism compensation. 1 7
One program operates by supporting the market for terrorism insur-
ance. This program was created in the early 1990s in response to IRA
terrorism, primarily in London, and the unavailability of insurance
through insurance carriers' adoption of terrorism exclusions. This
program created a national mutual reinsurance company (the Pool
Reinsurance Company, or "Pool Re") in which the government is the
reinsurer of last resort for losses due to terrorist acts on the British
mainland." 8 In Northern Ireland, however, the British government
compensates property owners directly for losses due to terrorist at-
tacks. 1" 9 While the incidence of terrorist acts in Northern Ireland was
high when the program was created, property values were low, keep-
ing the cost of compensating property damage in Northern Ireland
relatively low.
The United States has taken an insurance approach to some mass
injuries that were thought to require government intervention. The
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) was set up in 1988 to
protect vaccine producers from tort suits, while also providing com-
pensation to those injured by vaccines. 120 Public health policy favors
widespread participation in vaccination programs, but it is inevitable
that some persons who are vaccinated will be injured. Moreover, the
threat of large judgments for an unknown number of vaccine recipi-
ents could easily cause producers to exit the market, as the profit mar-
gins on vaccines are not large. The VICP is overseen by the
Department of Health and Human Services and special masters within
the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. There is a cap of $250,000 for each
claim, and a statute of limitations of three years from the administra-
tion of the vaccine. Decisions of the special master can be appealed to
a judge of the Court of Federal Claims and then to the Federal Cir-
117. See William B. Bice, British Government Reinsurance and Acts of Terrorism: The
Problems of Pool Re, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 441 (1994) (describing the British terrorism
reinsurance program and related public policy problems).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 463 n.126.
120. See MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON ET AL., USE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, SPECIALIZED DE-
CISION MAKERS. AND CASE MANAGEMENT INNOVATIONS IN THE NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY
COMPENSATION PROGRAM 14 (1998).
2003]
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CUit.1 2 1 The VICP replaces tort litigation, but it does not attempt to
provide compensation equal to tort damages. Of course, most people
injured by vaccines are infants or children, who do not usually receive
extremely high tort awards.
Congress has turned to the insurance market as a way to provide
protection for the public from property damage caused by terrorist
acts. On November 26, 2002, Congress passed the Terrorism Risk In-
surance Act of 2002 (TRIA), t 22 which is designed to assure that ter-
rorism coverage is widely available and affordable in property and
casualty insurance policies, and committed the federal government to
pay ninety percent of the cost of claims over the policy deductible, up
to a total amount of $100 billion per year, during a three-year transi-
tion period. The statute also establishes a system of regulation to as-
sure that after the transition period premiums will appropriately
reflect the costs of terrorism coverage and makes the federal govern-
ment the reinsurer of last resort in case property losses are too large
for the insurance industry to cover. Under the statute, the federal
government does not directly provide compensation for property
damage caused by terrorism, but it does undertake to assure that ter-
rorism insurance is available and affordable, thus making compensa-
tion available through a market solution. 123
Taking the view that terrorist acts are a risk that may appropriately
be compensated by a form of government-provided insurance, a vic-
tim compensation program could provide benefits that look like insur-
ance benefits: a standard payment for death and payments for
personal injury based on the type and severity of the injury, coupled
perhaps with noncash benefits such as medical insurance, perhaps
under programs serving federal employees or veterans, and housing
assistance. Indeed, during the hurried negotiations that led to the pas-
sage of ATSA, White House Budget Director Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.
proposed a flat payment for survivors' families of $100,000 (later
raised by Congress to $250,000).124
Adopting the insurance model would eliminate the procedural and
philosophical difficulties associated with the tort compensation model.
The program would be more easily administered and would better re-
flect the equality principle.
121. See generally Jonathan Groner, Vaccine Bill Becomes Big Headache, LEGAL TIMES, Mar.
13, 2003, at 1.
122. See TRIA, supra note 14.
123. For a discussion of the case management provisions of TRIA, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 54-58.
124. See Kosterlitz, supra note 90.
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IV. DESIGNING A COMPENSATION PROGRAM FOR FUTURE
VICTIMS OF TERRORISM
The preceding discussion concludes that a program structured as a
form of government-provided insurance against personal injury or
death caused by acts of terrorism, together with federal guarantees
that terrorism insurance for property damage will be available and
reasonably priced, would be preferable as a matter of public policy to
the ATSA tort settlement model as a means for providing compensa-
tion to future victims of terrorism. The insurance model might be sim-
pler to administer as well.
Assuming, however, that an ongoing program to compensate vic-
tims of future terrorist acts follows the tort settlement model, what are
the important issues of procedural design? What questions would
have to be answered in structuring the program, and what have we
learned from the experience of the September 11th Fund?
A. Structure
Because of the haste in which the September 11th legislation was
drafted, even basic structural elements were only sketched, or were
left to be filled in later. For example, the allocation of rulemaking and
reviewing power between the Attorney General and the Special
Master, which was left ambiguous in the statute, was resolved by the
Special Master issuing legislative rules covering such matters as the
right to and nature of evidentiary hearings and administrative review.
The legislation creating a future compensation program would
likely specify many of the structural and procedural provisions that, in
the case of the September 11th Fund, were worked out by the Special
Master through regulation. Congress knows how to identify the na-
ture of such provisions. Indeed, it provided a good list in legislation,
passed in 2002, directing the President to submit a proposal for a vic-
tim compensation program for acts of international terrorism from
November 1979 forward:
The legislative proposal shall include, among other things, which
types of events should be covered; which categories of individuals
should be covered by a compensation program; the means by which
United States victims of prior or future acts of international terror-
ism, including those with hostage claims against foreign states, will
be covered; the establishment of a Special Master to administer the
program; the categories of injuries for which there should be com-
pensation; the process by which any collateral source of compensa-
tion to a victim (or a relative of a deceased victim) for an act of
international terrorism shall be offset from any compensation that
may be paid to that victim (or that relative) under the program es-
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tablished by this section; and identifiable sources of funds including
assets of any state sponsor of terrorism to make payments under the
program.125
Let us consider some of these structural questions that are essential
to sound procedural design.
1. Where Is the Program's Institutional Home?
Generally speaking, contract and tort (or tort-type) claims against
the government are assigned to the courts, whether Article III courts,
Article I courts such as the United States Court of Federal Claims, or
state courts. Locating such claims in the courts is consistent with the
fact that the claimant's right to payment usually depends on a deter-
mination of the government's fault or responsibility. Courts are the
traditional forum for determinations of fault and compensation for re-
sulting injuries. They are regarded as having special institutional com-
petence in valuing past injuries.
When the government creates a benefits or entitlement program,
however, the determination of eligibility and the amount of the award
is usually given to a specialized administrative agency, subject to judi-
cial review by Article III trial or appellate courts under a more or less
deferential standard. This option permits a degree of specialization
and procedural flexibility that is difficult to achieve within a court.
Additionally, an agency is freer to consider policy and budgetary con-
cerns in setting the level of payments. Under this model, a victim
compensation program could be lodged in an existing agency, such as
the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, the Social Security
Administration, or even the newly-created Terrorism Risk Insurance
Program within the Department of the Treasury, 126 or in a newly-cre-
ated agency.
Occasionally Congress has created a hybrid structure combining the
efficiency and entitlement aspects of an agency with the compensa-
tory, accuracy, and legitimacy aspects of a court. The VICP is analo-
gous to terror victim compensation in some respects: it provides
government compensation for unavoidable, possibly mass, injuries, in
order to protect the vaccine industry from tort litigation, promote
public health policy, and provide compensation to injured persons.
The VICP is administered by the Department of Health and Human
Services and by special masters within the United States Court of Fed-
125. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 626(b), 115 Stat. 748, 803 (2002).
126. TRIA, supra note 14, § 103(a)(1)-(2).
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eral Claims, an Article I court, with a limited right of review in the
Court of Federal Claims.' 27
The September 11th Fund, however, has a unique and puzzling in-
stitutional structure. It is a free-standing entity within the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ). The only statutory officer of the Fund is the
Special Master, who reports directly to the Attorney General. The
remainder of the institutional structure was invented by the Special
Master through regulations. This structure is unique because it lo-
cates a no-fault compensation program within the DOJ as a free-
standing entity. The DOJ, of course, is primarily concerned with law
enforcement, not with benefits administration, and the Fund is not
only separated from other benefits administrations but from all other
functions within the DOJ itself. The Special Master has both legisla-
tive and adjudicative functions but operates within no specified proce-
dural or institutional structure.
A further anomaly is that the person who is entrusted with all of the
functions of the program is called a special master-a term that in all
other contexts denotes a para-judicial officer, located within a court,
appointed by and subordinate to an Article I or Article III judge. A
special master is appointed to assist a court with a particular matter.128
Special masters are often appointed in complex litigation to oversee
administrative or preliminary adjudicative proceedings in a lawsuit, in-
cluding administration of a settlement agreement. There is no point
to calling an administrator within the Justice Department a special
master, other than to invoke the authority of special masters within
the federal courts in order to lend legitimacy to the adjudicative deter-
minations made by the administrator. If a special master does not
derive his or her authority from a court-and in fact the decisions of a
special master are not even subject to judicial review-then the title
takes on a completely different meaning from its normal usage. It
would be more accurate to give the head of the program an adminis-
trative title such as commissioner or administrator. 129
127. The Court of Federal Claims is an Article I court that has jurisdiction over claims against
the government that are "founded ... upon ... any Act of Congress or any regulation of an
executive department." 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000). Its judges are appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate for a term of fifteen years and receive the same pay as
federal district court judges. 28 U.S.C. §§ 171(a); 172 (a), (b)(2000).
128. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 989 (7th ed. 1999) ("master: ... 2. A parajudicial officer
.. . specially appointed to help a court with its proceedings"); FED. R. Civ. P. 53 ("special
master: A master appointed to assist the court with a particular matter or case").




It is helpful to compare the peculiar structure established by ATSA
with the original proposal by congressional Democrats, which would
have prescribed a much more traditional institutional organization. 130
The original proposal called for Congress to appropriate funds into a
"September 11th Compensation Fund. ' 131 (The persistence of the
original name explains the mystery of why the program is called the
September 11th Victim Compensation "Fund" when it is not a "fund"
at all, but an open-ended call on the Treasury.) The Fund would also
accept contributions from insurance companies, airlines, and other po-
tential tort defendants, "or any other entity that seeks to contribute,"
and would have a right of subrogation "against any airline, insurance
company or other entity found to be responsible for payment of com-
pensation to the victims and their families. ' 132 In the original concep-
tion the Fund was to provide a mechanism for coordinating all sources
of payments to the victims-programmatic (from the federal govern-
ment), fault-based (from private entities such as the airlines and prem-
ises owners), insurance, and private charity. Rather than being a no-
limit ATM card on the federal treasury, it would be a finite, defined
fund to be allocated among claimants. Under the proposal, compen-
sation payments would be made first from the nongovernment
sources, thus minimizing the public cost by using public funds only to
the extent that private funds were insufficient.
The Fund was to be administered by an Article I court, the "Sep-
tember 11th Compensation Court," which would be located in the
Southern District of New York and affiliated with the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York. Its presiding judge was
to be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, for a term of five years and would have been removable only
for good cause. The presiding judge would have the authority "to pro-
mulgate all procedural and substantive rules necessary to administer
the Fund,"1 33 as well as to hire hearing officers and administrative
staff. An initial determination of eligibility and compensation would
be made by court staff,134 and the claimant would have the right to
130. Robert S. Peck, The Victim Compensation Fund: Born from a Unique Confluence of
Events Not Likely to Be Duplicated, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 209 (2003). I am grateful to Robert
Peck, President of the Center for Constitutional Litigation, who was intimately involved in the
effort to include a victim compensation program in the bill, for providing me with this initial




134. Claimants would be entitled to "compensation for" "injuries as a result of" the Septem-
ber 11th crashes, and to reasonable attorneys fees as approved by the Compensation Court. Id.
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seek a hearing before a hearing officer, encompassing the right to
counsel, the right to present documentary and testimonial evidence,
"and any other due process rights determined appropriate by the Pre-
siding Judge. '135 The claimant would have the right to appeal the
Compensation Court's final disposition to the district court, with no
further appellate review.
Thus, the initial Democratic proposal was for a more familiar and
more formal, institutional structure. Not only were the Fund's proce-
dures more fully specified in this skeleton proposal than in the final
legislation, they were not sui generis, but were within a procedural
tradition that could have been used to further define the institution
and its processes. Rather than having to solicit thousands of public
comments over a period of months before promulgating regulations,
an Article I court with a statutory mandate to provide certain types of
procedural protections could have instituted procedural rules (such as
evidentiary rules) quickly, with oversight from the district court.
Adjudication in a court might seem more consonant with applying a
tort measure of damages, as well as better suited to administering a
system in which government liability is open-ended rather than lim-
ited to a pre-determined dollar amount as in most settlement agree-
ments. Placing victim compensation within the structure of the
federal courts could lend the program valuable institutional legitimacy
and authority, rather than making those attributes dependent on the
personal qualities and reputation of the special master or the results of
particular determinations. This would help to insulate the administra-
tion of the program from charges of bias (which were frequent if
seemingly unsupported). It would also provide a visibly nonpartisan
mechanism for oversight and review of individual compensation
determinations.
On the other hand, an Article I court under the supervision of a
federal district court would probably have tended to have more for-
mal rules, more process and procedural rights, more opportunity for
appellate review and consequent delays, and a greater tendency to-
ward both procedural and substantive rules that mimicked traditional
tort litigation. There is a general perception, whether it is accurate or
not, that a lack of formality in alternatives to adjudication, such as
settlement claims facilities under special masters, leads to fewer de-
lays, lower costs of administration, and greater user-friendliness than




Fund was undoubtedly intended to provide swifter resolution and pay-
ment than the norm for litigation in courts.1 36
These considerations did not receive significant attention in the
brief time between the first mention of victim compensation and the
introduction and rapid passage of the bill. The Republican leadership
did not want to create a new court or formalize the selection of the
head of the program through the advise and consent process, a five-
year term, and the tenure provisions of the Democrats' draft. (Recall
that until much later, Republicans opposed creation of a Department
of Homeland Security and the federalization of airport screeners.)
From an institutional and constitutional perspective, it would make
more sense to follow either of the traditional models-administrative
agency or Article I court-rather than the curious hybrid of the Sep-
tember 11th Fund. The Article I court model would emphasize pro-
cess protections and the adjudicative nature of the program, while the
agency model would embody an entitlement perspective and would
probably tend to make the program look more like other government
benefit programs. While the "special master" terminology recalls the
Article I court model, the legislative history suggests that Congress
had predominantly in mind creating a speedy and streamlined process
(commanding that determinations be made within 120 days and taking
issues of causation and fault off the table) rather than a formalized,
due process adjudicative model. If a future program might cover ex-
posure-only claimants or later-manifesting injuries, however, so that
eligibility might not be so easily determined and causation might be a
significant issue, the mass tort experience suggests that more attention
to due process and adjudicative procedures may be warranted.
2. Who Should Run the Program?
In the initial negotiations over the September 11th Fund, Demo-
crats argued that the program should be run by a senior judge, subject
to Senate confirmation. 137 Appointing a senior judge would have em-
phasized the adjudicative and rights-based nature of the program, and
would have lent authority and impartiality to the new program.1 38
136. Though the pace of final resolution and payments has been slower than the drafters prob-
ably foresaw, the Special Master promulgated regulations early on to allow interim payments to
claimants pending final resolution. Additionally, private charities and other sources (such as
employee benefits and insurance) provided funds to many victims and their families.
137. Belkin, supra note 17, at 94.
138. Although sitting Article III judges generally cannot exercise non-Article III powers and
must sit in an Article III court, this restriction would not apply to a retired judge. A retired
judge can continue to retain her title and full salary if she "has performed substantial duties for a
Federal or State governmental entity" that "is equal to the full-time work of an employee of the
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The final version of the bill adopted the Republican position, favor-
ing a special master appointed by the Attorney General, whose deci-
sions could not be appealed. Subsequent legislation directing the
President to propose a compensation program for all victims of inter-
national terrorism from 1979 forward also seemed to contemplate that
the program would be administered by a special master.1 39
This extraordinary institutional structure has actually worked rather
well. It was imperative that the program be put in place immediately
and begin operating at once, that extensive rulemaking be completed
very quickly, and that extensive outreach be done among families that
had suffered horrific losses and had to make decisions of great conse-
quence in the midst of many kinds of uncertainties. Special Master
Feinberg's long experience in mediating, facilitating, and administer-
ing mass tort settlements, as well as his reputation among lawyers and
judges and his single-minded dedication to doing an impossible job,
enabled him to create an agency that does about as good a job as
could reasonably be expected given the constraints of the statute he
was responsible to implement. It is possible that no one but a czar
could have created a functioning organization so quickly while retain-
ing the respect, if not the agreement, of the various stakeholders. If
the procedural rules had been written by the Attorney General's staff,
as is suggested by the statutory language, 140 there would likely have
been considerable wrangling over the Interim and Final Rules that
might have prevented the Fund from getting itself together in time to
win over the potential claimants. Moreover, rulemaking by the Attor-
ney General would have increased the perception, and likely the real-
ity, of the role of political maneuvering in the rulemaking process.
While Special Master Feinberg was criticized for being autocratic,
even his critics did not suggest that his decisions were affected by po-
litical pressure.
Nevertheless, this structure should not be adopted for future com-
pensation programs. Combining legislative and adjudicative powers
judicial branch." 28 U.S.C. § 371(b)(1), (e)(1)(D) (2000). The use of retired judges would avoid
the issues that have arisen when sitting federal judges have undertaken non-Article III duties
(e.g., Chief Justice Warren's chairmanship of the Warren Commission, Justice Robert Jackson's
service as chief prosecutor for the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal).
139. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Ap-
propriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-77, § 626(b), 115 Stat. 748, 803 (2002). ("The legislative pro-
gram shall include ... the establishment of a Special Master to administer the program.").
140. See Appendix text accompanying notes 61-69. But see Colaio v. Feinberg. 262 F. Supp.
2d 273, 286 (2003) (rejecting plaintiffs' claim that "Congress did not delegate to the Special
Master the power to prescribe the standards by which awards are determined ... [and] that the
Special Master was to serve as a quasi-judicial official responsible for assessing evidence and
calculating awards according to criteria defined by Congress").
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in a single person, and making that person exempt from any adminis-
trative or judicial review, can lead to conflicts of interest, blind spots,
poor organization, and the appearance of arbitrariness or bias. Insti-
tutional design should not depend on finding a single individual with a
unique set of talents and experience; rather, it should assist whoever is
assigned to the institution to make good decisions.
The appointment of a distinguished senior judge or a preeminent
mediator and special master such as Mr. Feinberg signaled the impor-
tance Congress assigned to the program and was surely intended to
reassure claimants about the impartiality and integrity of the process.
Would future programs require an administrator of such stature, espe-
cially if the events were less spectacular and less nationally traumatic?
If future events were more like the Oklahoma City bombing, the em-
bassy bombings, the Beltway snipers, or the anthrax letters, it might
seem appropriate to dial down the prestige of the appointed adminis-
trator. Once regulations and procedures for the program are estab-
lished, the administrator's rulemaking powers would be of less
consequence. The appointment of a senior judge could lend prestige
to the program, and there is a fairly large pool of senior judges from
which to choose, but-as has been the case with Mr. Feinberg-ad-
ministrative abilities might be more important than adjudicative
expertise.
3. Who Should Appoint the Head of the Program?
Obviously, the higher the rank of the person appointing the head of
the program, the greater the prestige of the position. The highest
prestige would come from appointment by the President and confir-
mation by the Senate, as originally proposed by the Democrats. This
process may not have been feasible for the September 11th Fund be-
cause of the press of time, and the experience of the September l1th
Fund suggests that it is not necessary. Other possibilities are appoint-
ment by the Attorney General, as ATSA provides, by the Director of
Homeland Security, or by whatever administrative agency the pro-
gram might be made part of.1 4 1
4. How Should Subordinate Hearing Officers Be Chosen?
If there are a sufficient number of claimants, there will have to be
more than one person to determine the amount of the awards. The
more individualized the decision has to be, the more evidence and
141. Special masters attached to a court are appointed by the judge to whom the particular
case or matter is assigned.
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technical expertise will be required and the more necessary it will be
to have additional adjudicative staff, and the more highly skilled those
persons will have to be.
In the case of the September 11th Fund, the legislation authorized
the Special Master to employ and supervise subordinate hearing of-
ficers but did not specify how they were to be chosen. Special Master
Feinberg handled the initial phase of Fund administration himself,
with subordinates who did not take a prominent public role. In Sep-
tember 2002, he appointed forty-one hearing officers to conduct both
preliminary hearings and appeals of preliminary awards. 142 In the fu-
ture, claimants might be more geographically dispersed, leading to an
even greater need for subordinate decisionmakers.
There were no published criteria for the selection of Special Master
Feinberg's subordinate adjudicators. Though the individuals selected
had impressive resumes, the list was criticized for including "too many
corporate defense lawyers and too many people plucked from Mr.
Feinberg's Rolodex of friends, former colleagues and fellow
mediators."143
While it may be appropriate for heads of departments to have a
high degree of freedom to appoint high-ranking policy-making subor-
dinates, when the job is adjudicative in nature this may diminish the
perception of impartiality and independence that, in turn, contributes
to the perception that the process is fair. Therefore, there should be
regularized procedures for appointing such subordinates. Administra-
tive agencies have regular procedures for selecting administrative law
judges, as do district courts for the selection of magistrate judges. In
any event, there should be more transparency in the qualifications to
be considered in appointing the hearing officers and a more open ap-
plication process.
5. How Should the Program Be Activated?
At this point, it probably would not be desirable to create a perma-
nent specialized body that deals only in terrorism claims. Terrorist
acts are sporadic and, thus far, infrequent, so the members would be
sitting around most of the time with nothing to do. If victim compen-
sation is administered through an existing administrative structure,
such as FEMA or the Court of Federal Claims, the terrorism cases
could be incorporated into its ongoing docket. If victim compensation
142. David W. Chen, Legal Heavyweights To Help Decide Sept. 11 Fund Appeals, N.Y. TIMES,




continues to be as generous as the September 11th Fund has been,
however, it may make a poor fit into a program that administers pro-
grams such as veterans' or social security benefits. Therefore, a sepa-
rate administrative body is likely to be utilized to implement the
legislation.
That body will have to be organized so that it can spring into action
on short notice. The triggering event would be a certification that a
particular event qualified as a terrorist act under the statute creating
the program. In the case of the September 11th program, Congress
made this determination legislatively. The legislative history of ATSA
demonstrates why this is a bad idea. The pressure to act quickly in
order to protect the air transport infrastructure and to reassure the
public led to legislation that was adopted with almost no deliberation
or debate.1 44 In fact, it appeared that most members of Congress had
not even read the legislation when they voted. Congress simply can-
not move quickly enough.
A more practical idea is to designate a high official, or a small group
of officials, in the executive branch to make the certification. Under
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), the determination is to be
made by the Secretary of the Treasury (because certification autho-
rizes payments to be made directly from the national treasury to insur-
ers) with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General.1 45 This determination cannot be delegated and is not subject
to judicial review. It seems sensible to centralize, or at least to coordi-
nate, the authority to certify a terrorist act for purposes of the various
federal responsibilities that turn on such certification. The high de-
gree of discretion in the TRIA certification procedure affords flexibil-
ity to respond to a variety of novel future terrorist incidents, and the
immunity from judicial or administrative review limits the chance that
a quick response will be frustrated by second-guessing or litigation
over the determination. On the other hand, giving an executive offi-
cial unlimited and unreviewable discretion could allow arbitrary or
politically-motivated action.
These concerns could be addressed by specifying criteria for certify-
ing a terrorist attack, such as the number of deaths, the dollar value of
insurance claims or property loss, and so on. The more fixed and de-
tailed such criteria are, of course, the more likely that an event that
should be certified will not meet the criteria, or vice versa. And it is
sometimes hard to distinguish "terrorism" from "crime," especially if
144. See Appendix text accompanying notes 22-53.
145. TRIA, supra note 14, § 102(1).
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domestic terror is involved (one needs only to think of Timothy Mc-
Veigh, Ted Kaczynski, or the Beltway snipers.)
In general, the more the program is embedded in an agency or
other organization that does similar work on an ongoing basis, the
more clearly the procedural and substantive rules governing its opera-
tions are specified in advance, and the less individualized (and there-
fore time- and labor-intensive) its decisions, the more quickly it can
get to full speed once a triggering event occurs.
6. How Should the Program Be Coordinated with Litigation?
The primary purpose of ATSA was to limit the tort liability of the
airlines to ensure that they would remain solvent and would be able to
continue to obtain insurance. In providing an alternative to tort litiga-
tion against the airlines and other secondary defendants, Congress did
not intend to discourage litigation against the terrorists themselves or
their co-conspirators or sponsors. In fact, Congress has passed legisla-
tion making it easier to bring such suits in federal court.146 The first
coordination objective, then, is to ensure that the compensation pro-
gram is a substitute for tort litigation against the protected entities,
but not others.
Determining which potential defendants should be protected is a
complex public policy question. For example, should government
compensation substitute for tort litigation only when the potential de-
fendants are part of essential infrastructure or otherwise able to lobby
Congress successfully for protective legislation? 147 Should a defen-
dant's alleged negligence be taken into account in determining
whether or how much to substitute the government as payor, to pre-
serve incentives for taking care? Or would allowing plaintiffs to sue
nonconspirator defendants even for gross negligence simply open the
can of worms that the victim compensation legislation was designed to
keep closed? I will not discuss such policy issues here, but will touch
only on procedural issues of coordinating victim compensation pro-
grams with tort litigation.
ATSA attempted to force claimants to choose between government
compensation and tort litigation against the airlines and others by
conditioning participation in the Fund upon waiver of the right to sue
146. Multiparty, Multiform Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C. § 1369; TRIA, supra note
14, § 107(a)(1).
147. "If your death involves an industry that the government feels compelled to protect,
you're in luck. But if it's an industry that the government would let go under, you are on your
own." Belkin, supra note 17, at 95.
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anyone who did not participate directly in the terrorist act. 148 Waiver
of tort claims was an essential part of the statutory purpose of protect-
ing the airlines from massive tort liability. Even if the airlines were
negligent in allowing the hijackers to get on board, to take over the
planes, and to crash three of them into their targets without being
overwhelmed or intercepted, the necessity of shielding the airlines
from tort liability in excess of their insurance coverage was deemed
more important than preserving victims' right to sue.
The waiver mechanism was successful. Many potential claimants
delayed filing claims so as to obtain more information about the size
of the awards from the Fund and the possibilities for tort recovery. In
the end, ninety-seven percent of eligible families chose the Fund over
litigation. 149 It is estimated that total payments will exceed $5
billion.150
The original version of the bill would have capped the airlines' lia-
bility but would not have provided any compensation from the gov-
ernment. Such a plan, enacted after the events occurred and the
losses were sustained, might have been found to violate due
process. 15'
In designing a plan for future terrorist attacks, however, other op-
tions would be available. Acting under its Article I powers, Congress
could create a federal cause of action for injuries sustained as a result
of a terrorist attack as defined by a designated government official,
provide for exclusive federal jurisdiction and limited venue for such
claims, and declare that the statute preempts state law as to all claims
arising out of, or related to, such attacks. The statute could specify the
criteria for seeking damages under the statute and could provide that
in lieu of recourse against any other persons, victims and their survi-
vors would be entitled to certain benefits under the statute.
Because no such injuries have yet occurred, preemption of state law
would not constitute a taking.15 2 Once the state law tort remedy is
148. Though the Fund compensates only for personal injury and death, claimants must waive
their right to sue for all damages, including property damage. ATSA, supra note 1,
§ 405(c)(2)(A)(ii), (3)(B)(ii).
149. See Chen, supra note 69.
150. Id.
151. Whether plaintiffs would have had legally viable claims against such defendants, and
whether juries could have been trusted to decide such cases based on the law, are separate and
controversial issues.
152. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978). Duke
Power Co. upheld the Price-Anderson Act's limitation on liability of private parties (primarily
utilities and component manufacturers) in the case of a future catastrophic accident at a nuclear
power plant. The Court held that the limitation on liability was a valid economic regulation
designed to stimulate private development of electric energy through atomic power and to pro-
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eliminated prospectively, it would not be necessary to make compen-
sation from the Fund comparable to tort damages in order to per-
suade claimants to give up their right to sue.153 Freed from the
practical need to lure claimants away from the tort system and the
constitutional concern over how much "compensation" is "just," the
statutory compensation could be different from tort damages. 154 It
could, in fact, be structured along one of the other models discussed in
Part III-act of war, disaster relief, or government-provided
insurance.
Congress has, in fact, already adopted aspects of this approach in
legislation passed since ATSA. TRIA contains litigation management
provisions that create an exclusive federal cause of action for personal
injury, property damage, or death resulting from an act of terrorism as
certified by the Secretary of the Treasury.1 55 All state causes of ac-
tion, except those against actual terrorists or their co-conspirators, are
preempted. 156 The substantive law is drawn from the state where the
act occurred.' 57 The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation
designates a district court (or courts) that will have exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction over all causes of action (including state causes of
vide compensation in the event of a catastrophic accident. Id. at 83. The Court emphasized that
"a person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law" and that the
"Constitution does not forbid.. . the abolition of old [rights] recognized by the common law...
to attain a permissible legislative object ... despite the fact that otherwise settled expectations
may be upset thereby." Id. at 88 n.32 (citations, internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed,
"[tihat the accommodation struck [between burdens and benefits of economic legislation] may
have profound and far-reaching consequences ... provides all the more reason for this Court to
defer to the congressional judgment unless it is demonstrably arbitrary or irrational." Id. at 83-
84 (footnote omitted).
153. Compare workers' compensation statutes, which replace tort claims against employers
and provide considerably lower recoveries than tort damages.
154. The Court in Duke Power Co. held that the fact that the specific limitation on liability
might not be enough to provide full compensation to victims of the hypothetical future accident
did not make it irrational or arbitrary. Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 84-85. "Initially, it is not at
all clear that the Due Process Clause in fact requires that a legislatively enacted compensation
scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable substitute rem-
edy.... [Tlhe Price-Anderson Act does, in our view, provide a reasonably just substitute for the
common-law or state tort law remedies it replaces." Id. at 88 (footnote omitted). However, the
Court also emphasized that the statute also commits Congress to review the situation if an acci-
dent should occur and to take whatever steps are deemed necessary to protect the public. See id.
at 90.
155. TRIA, supra note 14, § 107(a)(1).
156. Id. § 107(a)(2), (b).
157. Id. § 107(a)(3). There is an apparent gap in coverage. An act that occurs abroad against
a U.S. air carrier, vessel, or mission is expressly included in the definition of an act of terrorism,
but because it did not occur in any state, section 107(a)(3) does not specify the substantive law to
be applied. Perhaps federal courts will develop a federal common law, perhaps under their ad-
miralty jurisdiction, to cover such occurrences.
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action) arising from that terrorist act.' 58 The designated district court
has nationwide personal jurisdiction. 59 Although TRIA applies only
to property and casualty insurance, with the possibility that group life
insurance might be included if a study shows that its availability is
being restricted because of terrorism risk, 160 the litigation manage-
ment provisions, including the preemption of state causes of action,
expressly apply to all claims for personal injury and death, as well as
property damage.16'
This approach appears workable with respect to incidents such as
the events of September 11th. It might not work as smoothly for acts
such as the anthrax letters, in which victims might not be concentrated
in one location and familiar choice of law questions might occur. 162
TRIA uses the creation of an exclusive federal cause of action as a
device to coordinate tort suits in a single federal court, in order to
further the statutory purpose of "[ensuring] the continued widespread
availability and affordability of property and casualty insurance for
terrorism risk. ' 163 The same approach could be extended to permit
claims against terrorists and their conspirators to proceed in the desig-
nated federal court under federal law borrowed from the state where
the event occurred, and to provide a government compensation pro-
gram as the exclusive remedy for all other relief.
Similarly, the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act pro-
vides for original federal subject matter jurisdiction of claims arising
from a single accident when there are more than seventy-five claims
and minimal diversity exists. This provision permits removal of ac-
tions filed in state court to federal court and consolidation of all cases
into a single district court (or courts). It is already available for suits
against terrorists that meet minimal diversity requirements. The For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, waives the sovereign immu-
nity of foreign states that are designated as state sponsors of terrorism
and makes them subject to suit in United States courts for claims of
personal injury or death caused by "an act of torture, extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material
158. Id. § 107(a)(4).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 103(h), (i).
161. TRIA, supra note 14, § 107(a). TRIA has a sunset provision that would cause it to expire
in December 2005.
162. These problems would be no more severe, however, than they would in the absence of
the statute.
163. TRIA, supra note 14, § 101(b)(1)-(2).
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support . . . for such an act.' 64 This provision makes it easier to sue
governments that sponsor terrorism. 165
There is a second coordination issue: What if claimants are success-
ful in obtaining a large tort recovery against the terrorists? Osama bin
Laden, for example, is wealthy. Should the victim compensation pro-
gram include a right of subrogation or a set-off against the award from
the Fund? This is an issue of substantive tort policy rather than a
procedural issue. The collateral source rules applicable to September
11th Fund awards would offset any such recoveries obtained before
the determination of the claim against the Fund 66 but would not ap-
ply to judgments obtained after the award. Even though this dispa-
rate treatment appears illogical, it would encourage timing stratagems
to allow claimants to keep both awards and might reduce some vic-
tims' incentives to sue solvent terrorists, the likelihood of finding a
solvent defendant and enforcing a judgment against it is remote
enough and the desirability of encouraging private litigation against
terrorists' assets great enough that it probably would not be necessary
to try to recover any "excess" payments.
7. How Should the Program Be Coordinated with Other Payments
to Victims, Including Private Charity?
One of the most controversial issues with respect to the September
11th Fund has been a question of substantive tort policy: to what ex-
tent should the collateral source rule apply? The statute directs the
Special Master to "reduce the amount of compensation ...by the
amount of the collateral source compensation the claimant has re-
164. 28 U.S.C.A. §1605(a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 2002). This section was added to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and
the Flatow Amendment. See Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140, 144, 149
(D.D.C. 2002).
165. Suing state sponsors of terrorism may still not be successful. On November 28 and De-
cember 20, 2002, Congress further amended sectionl605(a)(7)(A) to specifically authorize the
then-pending suit Roeder. That suit, brought by the hostages held in the American Embassy in
1979 and their families, sought to recover damages of $33 billion from the government of Iran.
Roeder, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 144, 149. Although expressing annoyance at "Congress' intent to
interfere with ongoing litigation" and its failure to draft legislation that would accomplish its
clear purpose, and suggesting that the attempt to legislate a result in pending litigation violated
the separation of powers ((INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, 514
U.S. 211 (1995): United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128)), the district court concluded that
regardless of whether the government of Iran was immune from suit, substantive liability had
been abrogated by the Algiers Accords, the 1981 bilateral agreement between the United States
and Iran that secured the hostages' release, established the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal,
and prohibited U.S. lawsuits against Iran arising out of the hostage-taking. Id. at 144-48, 161-66.
184.
166. ATSA, supra note 1, § 405(b)(6).
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ceived or is entitled to receive ... .",167 The statute defines "collateral
source" as "all collateral sources, including life insurance, pension
funds, death benefit programs, and payments by Federal, State, or lo-
cal governments related to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of Sep-
tember 11, 2001."168
Deducting collateral source payments from awards would tend to
reduce the cost of the program to the U.S. Treasury and to reduce
payments from the Fund to the survivors of higher income decedents,
who presumably would have been more likely to purchase significant
amounts of life insurance. On the other hand, tort law in most states
does not take account of collateral source payments in determining
the amount of the judgment; this rule follows from the principle that
tortfeasors should internalize the costs of their activities, and should
not be able to avoid such costs by taking advantage of the tort victim's
prudence. By expressly rejecting the collateral source rule in the stat-
ute itself, Congress seemed to be opting for a sort of hybrid, safety-net
program that would assure that all victims received total payments
that were equivalent to, but not in excess of, tort-type damages.
Though the statutory language appears quite clear, its application
has been substantially narrowed in practice. First, private charitable
contributions were excluded by regulation from the definition of col-
lateral sources. 169 Deducting such contributions from awards would
have reduced the cost of the program and could have provided an
incentive for charities to direct their funds to those whose losses were
not covered by the Fund (e.g., persons whose injuries manifested
more than twenty-four hours after September 11th or who had prop-
erty damage rather than personal injuries). 170 Concerns were raised,
especially by charitable organizations, however, that deducting chari-
table donations from awards might cause private charity to dry up, or
might lead charities to defer making donations until after the awards
167. ATSA, supra note 1, § 405(b)(6).
168. Id. § 402(4).
169. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.47(b)(2) (2001). The value of services or in-kind charitable gifts such
as emergency housing, food, and clothing, and tax benefits received from the federal government
are also excluded. Id. § 104.47(b)(1), (3).
170. As an example of directing charitable funds to persons who were not covered under the
Fund, in August 2002, the American Red Cross and the September llth Fund (a nonprofit chari-
table organization, not the federal September l1th Victim Compensation Fund) announced a
program to pay for extended mental health treatment for people directly affected by the terrorist
attacks. An estimated 150,000 families would meet the eligibility requirements, and the program
would pay for treatment even if the person did not realize the need for it "for months or even for
years." Erica Goode, Program To Cover Psychiatric Help for 9/11 Families, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
2002, at Al. The September llth Fund, which has raised over $500 million, has already provided
cash assistance to more than 100,000 people. Id.
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had been paid out. Additionally, many donations had been
earmarked by the donors for those directly injured on September
11th. And reducing awards by the amount of charitable donations
was inevitably framed as taking money away from deserving victims
and diverting generous private donations to the federal treasury. This
position was not a tenable one for the Fund to take. As a result, the
approximately $2 billion raised by private charities for distribution to
the victims of September 11th was not deducted from the compensa-
tion paid by the government.
Excluding payments from charities from the statutory collateral
source reduction not only increased aggregate payments to the victims
but also skewed the distribution of payments. At least eighteen per-
cent of the approximately $2 billion in private charitable contributions
was earmarked solely for uniformed public workers. 17' The police
and firefighters who died in the World Trade Center were also eligible
for important benefits from their employers, including tax-free salary
continuation and survivors' benefits. They may also have (appropri-
ately) received payments from funds that were not specifically desig-
nated in their favor.
The exclusion of charitable donations thus led to a system that ben-
efited high-income victims and uniformed public safety employees
who received a large amount of designated charitable donations. The
relative position of lower-income victims was reduced even more than
it already had been by the decision to base compensation primarily on
income.
The treatment and coordination of payments from private charities
should be considered in drafting any future victim compensation pro-
gram. Such donations have been substantial in many instances besides
September 11th. For example, the Lockerbie Air Disaster Trust re-
ceived over £2 million, plus £370,000 in interest,'172 in addition to the
$500 million settlement from Pan Am. Contributions for the families
of the 168 people killed in the Oklahoma City bombing totaled about
$35 million. 173 One possibility was embodied in the Democrats' initial
proposal: create a fund that could receive not only federal appropria-
tions but also insurance proceeds, payments from entities that may
have been partly responsible for the success of the attack, and private
171. See The Foundation of the Better Business Bureau Serving Metropolitan New York. New
York BBB Announces Results on Survey of September lth Charity Activity (Aug. 23, 2002),
available at http://www.newyork.bbb.org/AlertDetl.asp?ID=l (last visited Oct. 14, 2003).
172. Stuart Millar, Relatives May Sue Lockerbie Charity: Trust Rejects Requests for Financial
Help from Families of Pan Am Bomb Victims, OBSERVER (Scotland), May 21, 2000, at 1.
173. Associated Press, A Nation Challenged: The Victims; Oklahomans Questioning Sept. 11
Aid, N.Y. TIMES, DEc. 23, 2001, at B8.
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contributions. This proposal would allow compensation efforts to be
coordinated and funds to be more equally allocated. The legislation
could also minimize the public cost of the program by specifying that
funds from private sources should be paid out first. The September
11th experience suggests that it is difficult to achieve this kind of coor-
dination after the events have occurred. Indeed, the Special Master
had to disregard the statutory directive that all collateral source pay-
ments should be offset because private charities, which received over
$3 billion in connection with September 11th, threatened to withhold
distributing funds until after awards had been determined in order to
avoid "subsidizing" the government.
Second, the drafters undoubtedly did not realize that the statutory
language created a loophole through which some families could avoid
the deduction of life insurance benefits from their awards. The statute
states that collateral source payments to the claimant must be ex-
cluded from the award, 174 but under the regulations collateral source
payments to other family members may be excluded. 175 A claim may
be filed by the "personal representative" of a decedent who died
aboard one of the flights or at one of the crash sites. 176
The regulations rely on state law to determine who could file a
claim as a "personal representative."'1 77 The personal representative
is either a person appointed by a court as the decedent's personal rep-
resentative or as the executor or administrator of the decedent's will
or estate, or, if no such person has been appointed, then "the first
person in the line of succession established by the laws of the dece-
dent's domicile governing intestacy. 1 78 Accordingly, it may be possi-
ble for a family with, for example, a surviving spouse and several
children to decide to have the person with the least collateral source
compensation file the claim in order to minimize the collateral source
reduction. (That person would have to be either first in line under the
intestacy laws or capable of being appointed by the court as a personal
representative.)
Obviously, the legislation creating any future victim compensation
program should carefully specify the way in which collateral source
payments should be treated, and this treatment should reflect the
goals of the program.
174. ATSA, supra note 1, § 405(b)(6).
175. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47(a) (2001).
176. ATSA, supra note 1, § 405(c)(2)(A)-(C).
177. See 66 Fed. Reg. 66,283, § 104.4 (Dec. 21, 2001).
178. Id. § 104.4(a)(1)-(2).
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If the goal is to function like a government-provided insurance pol-
icy against injury or death caused by terrorism, then the specified ben-
efits should be paid in full without regard to whether any collateral
source payments have been received.
If the goal is to ensure that the victims or their survivors receive
compensation at a designated level by committing the government to
"top up" any deficiency, then payments from all sources should be
deducted from awards.
If the goal is to provide for a certain level of compensation above
and beyond what the victim or survivors would have received if the
injury or death had been from other causes, then payments such as life
or disability insurance or employer-provided benefits should be disre-
garded, but charitable payments should be deducted from the
award. 79
If the goal is to replicate the results of the tort system, then the
program should follow the rules of the state of the victims' domicile.
If the goal is to encourage charitable donations from the public,
then such payments should not be counted (although then the public
will, in a sense, be paying twice, once as taxpayers and once as donors,
and there may be inequities in the allocation of total benefits).
Furthermore, if the compensation from the government program is
to be adjusted based on payments from other sources, the legislation
should specify how those payments are to be coordinated, to discour-
age gaming the system to delay collateral-source payments or deflect
them to a payee who does not "count" to maximize the payment from
the government program. The statute might even require that all
charitable donations intended for individual recipients be channeled
through a trust set up as part of the government compensation
program.
People do not like the idea of "taking money away" from police and
firefighters. Like members of the military, however, risk of injury or
death in the performance of their duties is part of the known condi-
tions of the job. Public safety employee contracts reflect the risky,
perhaps life-threatening, nature of the job by providing special bene-
fits if employees are killed or injured in the line of duty. There is no a
priori reason why such benefits should not be treated like other simi-
lar collateral source payments such as insurance-though Congress
179. This approach would be complicated by the likelihood that people, especially high-in-
come people, who work in locations or jobs that have a high risk of terrorist attack would logi-
cally purchase more insurance or would purchase terrorism insurance.
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might decide to give uniformed public workers and military personnel
the additional benefit of excluding them.
B. Procedures for Determining Awards
The type of hearing should depend both on the nature of the deter-
mination and the values and objectives of the program. If victim com-
pensation is intended to be similar to insurance, the procedures for
filing a claim can be simple, and a mid-level bureaucrat can make the
determination on the basis of the written materials submitted, with
some right of internal administrative appeal to ensure that the stan-
dards have been applied properly. A significant portion of the com-
pensation might be handled by enrolling survivors in various ongoing
benefit programs-disability, medical, housing assistance, fixed sti-
pends, and so on. There would be no need for more complex proce-
dures such as evidentiary hearings or expert witness testimony.
The more the award looks like tort damages, with individualized
determinations and a heightened desire for accuracy, the more proce-
dural complexity will be required and the more time-consuming and
costly the proceedings will inevitably become. Because the Septem-
ber 11th Fund was required by statute to base awards on a determina-
tion of actual economic and noneconomic losses, including lost future
income, it had to have formalized procedures. Whenever a determi-
nation of lost income is required, parties will have to have the right to
be represented by a lawyer, to submit factual evidence and expert tes-
timony, to discover and challenge the methodology to be used in the
calculation of the award, and to present their case and arguments to
the decision maker. Individualized determinations based on eviden-
tiary presentations, in turn, require evidentiary rules and standards of
proof-What evidence and assumptions may be used to calculate lost
income? Should lost income be calculated on an after-tax or before-
tax basis? What are the actuarial assumptions of the methodology?
How are facts demonstrated to be true? What factors can be consid-
ered in calculating pain and suffering or mental anguish? Does the
claimant or the administrator have the right to cross-examine
witnesses?
These additional procedures will be necessary because when the de-
cision is based on complex and technical factors, decision makers need
more, and more reliable, information and procedural guidance on how
to arrive at their decisions, and lay people need professional assistance
to understand and navigate the system. When something important is
at stake in an individualized determination, everyone in the process
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wants the decision to be made carefully and with all the relevant fac-
tual information.
It would be possible to make these determinations solely on the
basis of a written record, including the claimants' arguments as well as
their evidence. But other values and considerations counsel having
individual, or at least group, hearings with the opportunity to present
at least some live testimony. Individual hearings promote trans-
parency and legitimacy by giving claimants the opportunity to present
their own case, allowing them to see the presentation of the case, and
showing them that the decision maker is attending to the presentation.
Live testimony by certain expert witnesses can even make the process
more efficient by allowing the decision maker to raise questions, clar-
ify points, and seek the claimant's response to counter-arguments. If
the award depends on individualized determination of noneconomic
losses, such as pain and suffering, mental anguish, and diminution in
quality of life, there is really no substitute for live testimony.
Live hearings can serve other values as well. In many types of
cases, there is value for claimants in the very fact of being able to tell
their story in a formal setting, to a person vested with authority, and
having that story heard. The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust is a clas-
sic example of a claims process that was structured to give the claim-
ants an opportunity to express, in a formal setting, what the injury
meant to them in individualized, human terms. 180 Providing victims of
terrorist acts, or their survivors, the opportunity to testify about the
consequences of the events and to express their rage, frustration, and
sorrow could be a constructive and desirable function of claims ad-
ministration. If this is a goal of the process, it would be important to
ensure that hearing examiners reflect the pool of potential claimants
by race, sex, and other relevant factors, and to provide native speaker
examiners at the claimant's option. 181
If awards are to be calculated based on individualized determina-
tions of lost income and other similar factors, it could also be worth-
while to consider providing multiple procedural options, ranging from
extremely simple and speedy resolution (but with relatively small
awards) to more complex but nonadversarial proceedings in which
claimants could present additional evidence to justify higher awards,
to adversarial processes such as arbitration, with the highest possible
awards. The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust is an example of such a
180. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking the Mass Out of Mass Torts: Reflections of
a Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender, and




multi-track process. 182 The regulations for the September 11th Fund
adopted a form of multi-tracking. Claimants could elect in advance to
accept the presumed award, in which case they could receive their
award within sixty-five days of filing the claim (Track A). Or they
could choose the alternate track (Track B), in which they would re-
ceive an evidentiary hearing at which they could argue for an upward
departure from the presumed award. Track A would provide a speedy
and certain remedy, and Track B would provide additional procedural
rights, an individualized determination based on an evidentiary hear-
ing, and the chance of receiving a higher award, but not as soon.
Another procedural option is to provide appellate review, or layers
of review, within the claims process in which claimants can present
arguments against the hearing examiner's award. In the claims pro-
cess that was created to resolve the Prudential Life Insurance Sales
Practices Litigation, for example, claimants could pursue multiple
levels of review alternating between bodies chosen by plaintiffs' coun-
sel and the company. In the victim compensation context, this sort of
review process could include persons chosen by a claimants' repre-
sentatives group, or by a claimant-oriented group such as Trial Law-
yers Care, ATLA, or the American Bar Association.
Individualized proceedings lead inevitably to disparate awards for
seemingly similar claimants. If the proceedings are relatively complex
or the claims numerous there will have to be numerous hearing of-
ficers. It will then be necessary to have procedures for reviewing
awards for consistency. This should include administrative review of
proposed awards before awards become final. The process for appeal-
ing awards should also include controls to ensure that awards after
appeal are not systematically higher than unappealed awards.
Grids and caps can reduce the amount of evidence, time, and indi-
vidual attention needed to make each award, as well as even out dif-
ferentials in outcomes, but they make the determinations less
reflective of individual facts and circumstances, and reduce the sense
that a claimant's submissions and telling their story will make a differ-
182. See Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found?),
61 FORDHAm L. REV. 617, 630 (1992). Claimants could choose option 1 (short form and instant
offer), in which claimants need only file a form affidavit claiming use of the device and conse-
quent injury and received a fixed payment in exchange for a full relase; option 2 (claim form and
tailored offer), in which the claimant provided medical records substantiating use and injury, but
need not prove causation, and received scheduled compensation depending on the nature of the
injury; or option 3, in which the claimant provided more evidence, including evidence of causa-
tion and damages, and, where proof was shown, received a settlement offer based on historical
litigation settlements; and, for claimants who completed option 3 and were not satisfied with the
offer, a settlement conference, then binding arbitration or trial.
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ence in the outcome. Individualized determinations can seem unfair
because people are treated differently based on what may seem to be
irrelevant facts, and standardized determinations can seem unfair be-
cause they do not consider the individual.
C. Appeals and Judicial Review
In any compensation program there should be a provision for re-
view of the initial decision. In the simplest model, in which the only
real questions are whether the eligibility determination is correct and
whether the prescribed criteria have been correctly applied, elaborate
appeals procedures should be unnecessary, and internal administra-
tive review within the fund, under the direction of the administrator,
should be sufficient. The more complex the determination, the more
extensive and technical the evidence admitted, and the greater the
value placed on accuracy in the determination, the greater the pos-
sibilities for appellate review.
ATSA expressly provides that the Special Master's decisions on
claims to the September 11th Fund are not subject to judicial review.
This provision is clearly designed to speed the process along so that
claimants do not need to wait their turn for a court hearing. It may
also be intended to reduce the need for legal representation and to
avoid having determinations turn on technical or legalistic issues.
Claimants to the Fund have clear notice that the Special Master's
decisions are not subject to judicial review, and they have the option
to file suit in federal court where their right of appeal is preserved
rather than to file a claim for compensation from the Fund. Provi-
sions waiving any right of judicial review are routine in private settle-
ment agreements. Particularly in light of the favorability of the
criteria for determining awards and the size of the awards the Special
Master has made, one cannot get too worried over the lack of judicial
review of the September 11th awards. In other circumstances, how-
ever, it is possible that a program that preempts state law and elimi-
nates all possibility of recovery except through the fund, private
insurance, and suits against the terrorists and their accomplices, may
not be constitutionally able to be exempted from all judicial review.
Whether determinations of individual claims can be completely in-
sulated from judicial review has not yet been presented to the courts.
Judge Alvin Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York did,
however, sustain the availability of judicial review of the regulations
and procedures for determining claims. In Colaio v. Feinberg, he held
that the provision barring judicial review of the Special Master's de-
termination of claims does not preclude judicial review of "the legality
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of the regulations and of the interpretive methodologies, and policies
adopted by the Special Master."' 183 He also held that those regula-
tions, methodologies, and policies were within the Special Master's
discretion.1 84
D. Defining Eligible Claimants
There was considerable controversy over the regulations that
adopted state law as the rule of decision on who was eligible to be-
come a personal representative. 8 5 The most serious issue in ATSA's
definition of eligible claimants, however, was its limitation of eligible
claimants to those who had suffered physical harm or death at the
scene of the crashes, or aboard the planes, at the time or in the "im-
mediate aftermath" of the crashes. 186 This provision was reasonably
effective in improving certainty about who was eligible, making eligi-
bility determinations simple, limiting the opportunities for fraud
(though there were still cases of fraudulent claims), keeping the total
costs of the fund down by limiting the number of claimants, and avoid-
ing the problems associated with future claimants.
In hindsight it became clear that this definition was much too re-
strictive. It excluded people who did not report their injuries within
twenty-four hours,18 7 as well as many rescue and reconstruction work-
ers who worked for days, weeks, and months under the burning rub-
ble, breathing smoke, ash, and toxic fumes, and who were either
injured on the site or later developed respiratory ailments as a result
of their efforts. 18 8 It is still possible that some of these people may
183. ATSA, supra note 1, § 405(b)(3).
184. Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285 (2003).
185. The primary objection was that same-sex partners could not serve as personal representa-
tives under the applicable state law. The Special Master concluded that the Fund had to align its
rules with state law to avoid conflicts in the administration of the decedent's estate.
186. ATSA, supra note 1, §405(c)(2)(A)-(C); 66 Fed. Reg. 66,282, § 104.2(c)(1),(2) (Dec. 21,
2001). "Immediate aftermath" was defined as twelve hours for non-rescue workers and ninety-
six hours for rescue workers. 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,282, § 104.2(b). "Physical harm" required "a
physical injury that was treated by a medical professional within 24 hours of the injury having
been sustained or within 24 hours of rescue" (with some minor exceptions) and, in non-fatal
cases, required "contemporaneous medical records." Id. § 104.2(c)(1), (2).
187. See 67 Fed. Reg. 11,242 (Mar. 13, 2002) ("Commenter indicated that-despite being seri-
ously injured-he spent more than 24 hours trying to locate his family members.").
188. The regulations addressed this issue by defining "immediate aftermath" to mean twelve
hours after the crashes for "all claimants other than rescue workers," and ninety-six hours after
the crashes for "rescue workers who assisted in efforts to search for and recover victims." 28
C.F.R. § 104.2(b) (2002) There is no requirement that the injury be sustained within this period,
only that it be "sustained as a result of" the crashes. Even if all of the workers at the site were
construed to have been searching for victims in addition to clearing and restoring the site, many
of them arrived more than ninety-six hours after the crashes and, therefore, are not covered at
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later develop cancer, emphysema, or other serious diseases as a result
of their work in the aftermath of the collapse. If they were not pre-
sent at the site in the first ninety-six hours after the crashes, however,
they would not be eligible to file claims.189 In the case of latent inju-
ries, the ability to recover may also be limited by the definition of
"physical harm" to include only "a physical injury to the body that
was treated by a medical professional within twenty-four hours of the
injury having been sustained."'190
There may be other types of injuries that should be compensated as
well-people who were held hostage but not physically injured, or
persons who were not physically injured but suffered emotional
trauma. 91 A decision would have to be made whether to limit the
compensation program to acts taking place on U.S. territory, or acts
by international terrorists, as ATSA and TRIA do.192
The line between providing clear rules that control the number of
potential claimants, facilitate administering the process, and discour-
age fraud on the one hand, and providing enough flexibility to allow
the program to respond to unforeseen circumstances on the other, is a
fine one. We know now that a compensation program should be flexi-
ble enough to include people who are injured after the terrorist act
itself, but as a result of that act, such as rescue workers and workers
clearing the rubble, even if they are not present when the act oc-
curs. 193 We also know that such injuries, as well as injuries from other
possible kinds of terrorist attacks, such as biological weapons and
"dirty" bombs, can take a long time to manifest themselves after ex-
posure. We know that the problem of future claimants, persons who
have already been exposed but who may or may not suffer serious
consequences in the future, has been one of the most difficult
problems in mass tort litigation. And we can infer that terrorist at-
tacks are likely to occur in unforeseen ways and to present novel
problems. A program to compensate future terror victims should re-
flect very careful thought about how to achieve flexibility in respond-
ing to novel circumstances while providing adequate guidance and
certainty.
189. Id.
190. Id. § 104.2(c)(1), (2).
191. See supra note 170 (Private charities created a program to provide extended mental
health care to as many as 150,000 families.).
192. Technically, a U.S. embassy is not on foreign soil. TRIA expressly includes damage that
took place within the United States, to an American air carrier or vessel, or on the premises of
an American mission abroad. TRIA, supra note 14, § 102(1)(A).




E. Defining Eligible Losses
Unlike most airplane crashes, the September 11th attacks caused
many, many times more deaths and property damage on the ground
than on the planes. Even terrorist bombings until that time had
caused comparatively little damage; the most serious, the bombing of
the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killed 168 people
(just six percent of the total at the World Trade Center) and caused
property damage, mostly to federal property, that was far less than the
billions of dollars of damage caused by the September 11th attacks.
ATSA provided victim compensation only for personal injury and
death. In order to file a claim, however, claimants had to waive all
claims against anyone other than the terrorists, even property damage
claims that were not covered by the Fund. Those who suffered only
property damage received nothing from the Fund, though they could
still bring private suits, and many have. But ATSA limited the liabil-
ity of air carriers to the insurance coverage on the planes, some $7
billion. 194
The decision not to compensate property losses was justifiable in
light of the cost of such a program, the difficulty and delays that would
be inevitable in administering so many claims (many of which could
have involved more complicated determinations than the decedents'
lost income), the fact that many property owners could rely on insur-
ance coverage, and the historical fact that the federal government has
not provided compensation for property damage in similar circum-
stances. Nevertheless, the possibility of enormous destruction of
property in a terrorist attack should be taken into account in consider-
ing a victim compensation program.
Congress has chosen to address the problem of property damage
caused by terrorist acts by strengthening and supporting the market
for insurance against such losses. TRIA was designed to guarantee
that insurance coverage for terrorism-related losses would be widely
available in property and casualty insurance policies, to support the
insurance industry in providing such coverage by paying for most of
such losses during a three-year transition period, by thereafter ad-
ministering a program by which the costs would be absorbed by poli-
cyholders through premium costs, and to serve as the reinsurer of last
resort should losses exceed the capacity of the insurance market.195
194. ATSA, supra note 1, § 408(a). The liability of other possible defendants, such as the Port
Authority, was not limited, but in order to file a claim with the Fund, claimants had to waive all
rights to file a civil action against anyone other than knowing participants or conspirators in the
act, except to recover collateral source obligations. Id. §§ 405(c)(3)(B)(i), 408(c).
195. TRIA, supra note 14. See discussion supra notes 54-58, 122-123 and accompanying text.
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The goal was to calm insurance markets and the public by reducing
uncertainty regarding future terrorist acts, to assure that property
owners would be able to purchase anti-terrorism insurance, and to
build a functioning market for such coverage. 196
This approach seems to be the correct one for property damage.
Most property owners carry property and casualty insurance, and the
cost of anti-terrorism coverage should be relatively low if spread
among all policyholders. There will still be difficult issues, such as
what happens if the property owner does not carry enough insurance
to cover losses from a terrorist attack, and whether those who own
property in low-risk or low-cost areas should subsidize those who own
property in, say, Manhattan. If the answer to the second question is
yes, there will be some incentive for financial and other industries to
concentrate in a few high-cost, high-risk geographical areas; if the an-
swer is no, there will be an incentive to decentralize those industries.
Nevertheless, the private insurance market appears to be a good tool
for addressing the property damage problem. 197
With respect to personal injuries, it might be possible to fashion a
compensation program by requiring life and medical insurance poli-
cies to contain anti-terrorism coverage. 198 Because the risk of death
or injury as a result of terrorist activity is very low compared to all the
other risks of daily life, terrorism insurance should not add signifi-
cantly to the overall cost of insurance (though this depends in part on
how pooling is done, that is, how broadly the risk is spread). How-
ever, many people do not have life or medical insurance at all, and
those who do have life insurance have widely varying amounts of cov-
erage. In general, higher income individuals will benefit more from
terrorism compensation that is included as a standard term in insur-
ance policies. Thus, if public policy favors adopting an insurance
model of compensation (that is, fixed payments and noncash benefits
that are essentially equal for all claimants with similar losses), that
objective can probably best be achieved through a compensation fund
196. Id.
197. This problem has arisen in connection with the British Pool Re program. See supra note
118 (describing the British terrorism reinsurance program and related public policy problems).
The issues are cogently analyzed in a fifty-year-old article; see generally Jack Hirshleifer, War
Damage Insurance, 35 REV. ECON. & STAT. 144 (1953), reprinted in 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (2002);
see also Peter Siegelman, A New Old Look at Terrorism Insurance: Jack Hirshleifer's War Dam-
age Insurance After Fifty Years, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 19 (2002) (retrieving Hirschleifer's article
from obscurity and applying it today).
198. TRIA requires the Secretary of the Treasury to determine whether the availability of
group life insurance is being affected by terrorism exclusions and if so, to include it within the
program. TRIA, supra note 14.
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with appropriate rules and regulations rather than through the insur-
ance market.
F. Reducing Costs and Delay
One rationale for creating a government compensation system was
to get money to victims faster and at a lower cost than would be possi-
ble through the court system. The statute provided, for example, that
the Special Master must finalize the amount of the award within 120
days of the filing of the claim. 199 Simply using a special master and
alternative dispute resolution model does not necessarily guarantee
that costs and delays will be lower, however.
There are several procedural ways to reduce costs and delays. One
is to standardize the remedy and the .evidentiary basis on which it is
awarded. As discussed above, this would reduce or eliminate the need
for evidentiary hearings, expert testimony, and other costly, time-con-
suming procedures. This decision, however, reflects fundamental pol-
icy choices about the rationale and goals of the program, and should
not be based simply on a desire to reduce costs.
Another way of reducing costs and delay is to have procedural and
substantive rules and regulations in place before the event occurs.
This would provide more certainty for potential claimants and would
allow the program to get up and running quickly.
A third way is to strip elements of proof or potential defenses away
from the case. For example, ATSA forbids the Special Master to take
negligence or other theories of liability into account in determining
awards. 200 As it turned out, causation was not an issue in light of the
definition of eligible claimants and the nature of the attack, so the
only issues for decision were the amount of compensation to award
based on the victim's economic and noneconomic losses.
It would be unwise to assume that this will be the case in future
events, however. For example, a chemical, biological, or nuclear at-
tack could cause latent harms that do not manifest themselves imme-
diately. For that matter, even for the events of September 11th it
seems clear in retrospect that injuries such as respiratory ailments suf-
fered by rescue and reconstruction workers should have been included
in the program. Such injuries may manifest themselves much later,
and causation may be a serious issue in those claims.




G. What If the Future Doesn't Look Like the Past?
The September 11th attacks were unexpected, and shockingly so.
In retrospect, they appeared to be foreseeable. When Congress
passed victim compensation legislation only eleven days after the at-
tacks, it seemed obvious that it was reasonableto limit compensation
to injuries sustained within a day or so of the crashes. Now it seems
even more obvious that rescue efforts and clearing the rubble would
be dangerous, would continue for many months, and could expose
workers to toxic substances that could cause injuries that would take
months or years to manifest.
We have already been warned that terrorist attacks in the future
might involve biological weapons, such as anthrax or smallpox, chemi-
cal weapons, or "dirty bombs" that would not require much techno-
logical sophistication and could be brought into the country in a
suitcase. We have been told that attacks might come on apartment
buildings, bridges, or water supplies, or might take the form of cyber-
terrorism.
All this is simply to repeat that compensation programs and the in-
stitutions that implement them, like generals, should beware of plan-
ning to fight the last war. To a point, we can try to foresee possible
types of attacks; to a point, we can try to build flexibility into the pro-
cedural design so that the program can respond nimbly to a variety of
types of events; and there is always the safety valve that Congress can
respond legislatively if the future is too different from the past to be
accommodated by existing institutions and procedures.
V. CONCLUSION
It is still too early to judge the success of the September 11th Fund.
It is not too early, however, to draw lessons for the design of compen-
sation programs for the future.
The central idea of this Article is that criticisms that have been
thought to be about procedure or implementation really flow from
much more fundamental problems of institutional design. Procedure
is not like a bandage that you slap on a wound or a vessel into which
you pour a dispute. Good procedural design flows from understand-
ing and making real the purposes and values of the substantive law or
program that the procedures will implement.
Many of the aspects of the September 11th Fund that have troubled
claimants and observers flow from the contradiction of adopting a tort
litigation and settlement claims administration model for a govern-
ment entitlement program. The policy rationale that supports basing
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tort damages on lost future income is not present when the govern-
ment volunteers to provide payment, and individualized damages
based largely on income or wealth are inconsistent with the principle
that-in the government's eyes-all persons are created equal. The
equality principle is a central pillar of our constitutional faith, and it is
especially important in times of national crisis when the people must
pull together. Tort-type compensation takes people who were killed
together in a terrible national trauma and says some are more valua-
ble than others-and that wealthy people deserve more government
assistance. Moreover, a tort measure of compensation makes the sys-
tem harder to administer, more costly for the taxpayer, and more out
of sync with how other similarly-situated persons are treated.
A better solution, in my view, would be to view government com-
pensation to terror victims as a form of government-provided insur-
ance against a remote but catastrophic risk that we all run just because
we live in this country. Government-provided insurance should be in
the same amount for everyone. The base amount should not be bro-
ken down into components such as pain and suffering or lost income,
but it might be adjusted for need-based factors such as number of de-
pendents and disability. Such adjustments should be standardized as
much as possible, or handled by the provision of noncash benefits
such as medical care, education, and housing assistance, perhaps by
including the recipients in an existing program such as one for federal
employees or veterans. Because it is not intended to make the recipi-
ent whole, this type of program does not require making judgments
about people's worth, or complex calculations, or deductions for pay-
ments from collateral sources. It could include noncash benefits such
as medical care. It could even take the form of a life annuity.
All of these benefits would be easy to administer, would promote
the equality principle (perhaps assisted by the need or relief princi-
ple), and could be calibrated with respect to the cost to the govern-
ment. Personal injuries and other injuries that are difficult to
monetize, such as captivity or torture, could be compensated through
this sort of government entitlement program. Property damage and
business loss could be addressed through government support and sta-
bilization of the private insurance market through legislation such as
TRIA.
A program such as this, put in place far enough in advance to allow
procedural and substantive rules to be developed before the program
is called on to pay claims, would eliminate many of the complexities
and uncertainties that have proven so difficult in the September 11th
context. Its procedural rules could be designed to be clear and intelli-
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gible, even to laypersons, and to express the values and implement the
purposes of the program.
In any event, the procedures by which victim compensation is pro-
vided must be consciously designed to fulfill the purposes and goals of
the program. Identifying, agreeing on, and understanding those pur-




THE HISTORY AND STRUCTURE




This Appendix provides a summary of the history of the legislation
and regulations that created the September 11th Victim Compensa-
tion Fund, and a guide to the structure and major provisions of the
legislation and the implementing regulations.
I. HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATION
A. H.R. 2891-Bailout Without Victims' Compenstion
Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it became
evident that the nation's airlines were in a precarious financial posi-
tion as a result of the attacks. According to the airlines, the industry
lost approximately $330 million each day that the airlines were
grounded and was expected to lose $24 billion during the coming
year.1 Within a week of the attacks, the five largest airlines (Conti-
nental, Northwest, American, United, and Delta) all announced sig-
nificant flight reductions and layoffs amounting to perhaps 100,000
employees. 2
In response to the airlines' financial difficulties, late in the after-
noon on Friday, September 14, Representative Don Young (Chairman
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure) introduced
H.R. 2891, "[t]o preserve the continued viability of the United States
air transportation system.' '3 H.R. 2891 was a simple airline relief bill.
It authorized the President to compensate air carriers from "losses
* Law Clerk to the Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts. Stanford Law School, J.D. 2003.
1. Hearing on H.R. 2891, To Preserve the Continued Viability of the United States Air Trans-
portation System, Before the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 107th Cong. (2001),
available at http://www.house.gov/transportationfullchearings/09-19-01/09-19-Olmemo.html (last
visited Oct. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2891]; see also H.R. REP. No. 107-45 (2001),
To Preserve the Continued Viability of the United States Air Transportation System: Hearing on
H.R. 2891 Before the House Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure 107th Cong. 44-45, 59-60
(2001), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/Trans/hpw107-45.000/hpwlO7-
45_0f.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003) (explaining calculations).
2. See Hearing on H.R. 2891, supra note 1.
3. H.R. 2891, 107th Cong. (2001).
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sustained . . . as a result of the events of the attack on the United
States on September 11, 2001" through a combination of direct pay-
ments, loans or loan guarantees, and suspension or modification of the
airlines' federal financial obligations.4 The bill was referred to the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on September 14.
5
As the clock turned past midnight, Representative Young sought
unanimous consent to discharge the measure from committee and
consider it immediately, but several Representatives objected because
the bill was being rushed.6
On Wednesday, September 19, the Committee held a hearing "to
receive testimony on H.R. 2891 and other possible legislation to pre-
serve the continued viability of the United States air transportation
system, and to receive testimony on the financial condition of the air-
line industry in light of the tragic events of September 11, 2001." 7 The
Committee received over eight hours of testimony, mainly from air-
line executives and labor union officials.8
During this hearing, several witnesses suggested that Congress
somehow minimize the airlines' liability to victims on the ground. 9
However, the case was put most forcefully by Leo Mullin, Chairman
and CEO of Delta, who testified on behalf of the Air Transport Asso-
ciation (ATA). 10 He explained that liability on the ground would pre-
vent the airlines from being able to access capital markets and thus
would undermine the entire bailout scheme.11 ATA proposed com-
plete immunity for damage to persons and property on the ground,
while preserving the rights of the passengers' survivors. 12
Later in the day, Representative Max Sandlin asked Hollis Harris,
President and CEO of World Airways, "Is there any advice you could
give to us on how we could work together as an industry and as a
Congress to provide relief to the families and the victims without fur-
ther victimizing the victims?" 13 When Harris did not appear to under-
4. Id. § 1(1)-(3).
5. 147 CONG. REC. H5703 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2001).
6. See id. at H5684-91.
7. Hearing on H.R. 2891, supra note 1.
8. See generally H.R. REP. No. 107-45 (2001).
9. See, e.g., id. at 38-39 (testimony of James P. Hoffa, General President, International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters), 64 (testimony of Tom Horton, Chief Financial Officer, American Airlines)
("Liability protection is probably the single most important thing that the government can do to
help us get back in the capital markets and help ourselves .... Until that cloud is lifted, I don't
think we are going to have any access to the capital markets.").
10. See id. at 41-49.
11. See id. at 46-47.
12. Id. at 47.
13. Id. at 151.
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stand, Representative Sandlin asked flatly, "Do you think some of the
money that we set aside, and certainly we want to help the airlines,
should some of that be set aside for a claim fund for the victims?
Would that be something to consider or not? ' 14 This was the first
mention in the legislative record of a victim compensation fund.
B. H.R. 2926-Bailout Plus Victim Compensation
Two days later, on Friday, September 21, Representative Young in-
troduced a new bill, H.R. 2926, the Air Transportation Safety and Sys-
tem Stabilization Act (ATSA). 15 That same day, Senator Tom
Daschle (for himself and Senator Trent Lott) introduced S. 1450,
which was identical to H.R. 2926.16 This bill provided considerably
more detail than its predecessor, and included a victim compensation
fund in Title IV.17
According to the New York Times, the fund was designed in less
than twenty-four hours.18 Like its predecessor (H.R. 2891), H.R. 2926
began as an airline bailout bill without a compensation fund. The
Democrats refused to agree to such a bill. The White House then
proposed a relatively simple plan: All victim lawsuits would be con-
solidated in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York, and the government would pay any amount by which judgments
exceeded the airlines' insurance coverage. 19 The bill "came close to
unraveling" because Democrats wanted to extend unemployment
benefits and health insurance to laid-off airline workers, whereas
Republicans were wary of the government covering airline liability.20
On the night of Thursday, September 20, House and Senate leaders
met to hammer out a compromise. The Democrats proposed an open-
ended fund, presided over by a senior judge subject to Senate confir-
14. Hearing on H.R. 2891, supra note 1, at 152.
15. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, H.R. 2926, 107th Cong. (2001)
[hereinafter ATSA]. ATSA was enacted as Pub. L. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230, (codified at 49
U.S.C.A. § 40101 note (West Supp. 2003)).
16. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, S. 1450, 107th Cong. (2001)
(2001); 147 CONG. REC. S9627 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001).
17. See ATSA §§ 401-09, 115 Stat. at 237-41.
18. See Diana B. Henriques & David Barstow, Fund for Victims' Families Already Proves Sore
Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at Al.
19. See id. The discussion that follows is based on the same article. The draft of the Demo-
crats' proposal provided by Robert S. Peck, The Victim Compensation Fund: Born from a
Unique Confluence of Events Not Likely To Be Duplicated, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 209 (2003), and
discussed at notes 140-146 of the main Article, indicates a proposal for a fund consisting of
specific congressional appropriations, with claims to be adjudicated by an Article I court.
20. See Lizette Alvarez, Washington Talk; With Bipartisan Zeal, Rival House Leaders Bond.,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2001, at A16.
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mation, with power to award any amount of money for both economic
and noneconomic losses. The Republicans extracted two key conces-
sions: collateral source payments would offset any awards, and the At-
torney General would have sole power to choose the fund's
administrator. This compromise became Title IV of H.R. 2926.21
C. Debate and Passage
Remarkably, the victim compensation fund element of ATSA re-
ceived very little attention during the debates. Few legislators men-
tioned it in their remarks, and those who did rarely broached the deep
underlying questions.
H.R. 2926 and its Senate companion S. 1450 were pushed through
even more quickly than the original bill.22 On the morning of Friday,
September 21, Senator Daschle requested unanimous consent to con-
sider S. 1450 for a one-hour debate without possibility of amendments
or motions.23 Several Senators took the procedural request for unani-
mous consent as an opportunity to comment on the merits. Senator
Daschle eventually renewed his motion for unanimous consent, and
the actual debate began.24 The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 96
to 1 at 6:20 p.m. 25
At 6:08 p.m., the House considered a resolution to allow one hour
of debate on H.R. 2926 and to close the bill to amendments or inter-
vening motions, other than a motion to recommit it to committee. 26
The resolution passed at 8:49 and debate began at 8:54 p.m. 27 The bill
passed the House at 11:06 p.m., by a vote of 356 to 54.28
21. See Henriques & Barstow, supra note 18.
22. Apparently, the airlines' insurers had threatened to cease providing liability coverage ef-
fective the following Wednesday, September 26, 2001. See 147 CONG. REC. H5900 (daily ed.
Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Representative William Lipinski).
23. 147 CONG. REC. S9584 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001). Sen. Daschle also asked unanimous
consent that if the House passed a bill identical to the Senate bill, that it be immediately consid-
ered and passed.
24. See id. at S9588.
25. See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 107th Congress - 1st Session, available at http://
www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll call lists/
roll call-vote cfm.cfm?congress=107&session=l&vote=00284 (last visited Apr. 1, 2003); 147
CONG. REC. S9604-05 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001); Bill Summary and Status for H.R. 2926, availa-
ble at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR02926:@@@L&summ2=M&#status (last
visited Apr. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Bill Summary for H.R. 2926]. The Senate does not record
times in its journal as often as the House does, which is why less detail is available about the
precise chronology in the Senate.
26. See H.R. Res. 244, 107th Cong. (2001).




1. The Debate in the House of Representatives
The House apparently saw H.R. 2926 as an airline bailout bill and
debated it as such. The first two mentions of airline liability caps were
brief and glancing. 29 The first substantive point about liability, made
more than twenty minutes into the hour allotted to the debate, was
that not just airlines, but also aircraft and component and parts manu-
facturers, were covered under the bill. 30 By 9:45 p.m.-fifty minutes
into a one-hour debate-only one more Representative had men-
tioned victims' compensation at all, again only fleetingly. 31
Not until almost 10:00 p.m. did a Representative indicate that he
might have actually read Title IV, or even a summary of it. Represen-
tative Robert Turner of Texas mentioned, for the first time on the
House floor, that the bill would provide victims "full recovery for
their economic and non-economic damages by the establishment of a
special master. ' 32 This was the first discussion of types of damages,
the special master, or any other aspect of victim compensation. By
10:15, with the clock still ticking, the only addition to the debate on
victims' compensation was Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee's state-
ment that "[t]his legislation also speaks to the tragedy and travesty of
6,000 dead; and I think we should compensate them as well."' 33 De-
bate was closed at 10:20 p.m., a motion to recommit failed at 10:57
p.m., and the bill passed 356 to 54 at 11:06 p.m. 34
This was the full extent of the actual debate on the House floor
before the bill was passed. Days or weeks later, a number of repre-
sentatives inserted "revised and extended remarks" into the record.
These after-the-fact revisions to the record only emphasize the sketch-
iness of the contemporaneous debate by illustrating what no one actu-
ally said. For instance, Representative Walter Jones of Ohio spoke for
thirty seconds soon after 9:45 p.m., during which she made one brief
remark about the victim compensation fund. 35 Later, she "revised
and extended" her remarks (to a length that could not possibly have
29. See 147 CONG. REC. H5899 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Rep. Gephardt); id.
(statement of Rep. Oxley).
30. See id. at H5901 (statement of Rep. Tiahrt).
31. See id. at H5903 (statement of Rep. Clement) ("[T]his bill helps to stabilize the industry
and assist families who have lost loved ones .... "). Shortly thereafter, one more Representative
referred to victim compensation, even more laconically. See id. at H5905 (statement of Rep.
Jones) ("I support victims compensation.").
32. Id. at H5906 (statement of Rep. Turner).
33. Id. at H5907 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).
34. See Bill Summary and Status for H.R. 2926, supra note 25. The motion to recommit con-
cerned matters not relevant here.




fit within thirty seconds) to critique the liability and compensation
schemes in some detail, including the government's assumption of lia-
bility, elimination of punitive damages, collateral source reduction,
and capping airline liability at the limit of insurance coverage. 36 Simi-
larly, Representative John LaFalce-who apparently did not speak at
all during the debate-later inserted remarks discussing the bill's
"gross inequities [of] compensating for economic losses based solely
on the deceased worker's earnings. '37 Because this aspect of the bill
was not mentioned at all on September 21, these remarks would have
materially contributed to the bill had they been uttered before its pas-
sage. Indeed, the one set of remarks that actually explained Title IV's
provisions-by Representative John Conyers, who claims to have
been "intimately involved in [its] crafting"-was later inserted by revi-
sion and extension.38
There are several reasons why Title IV received so little discussion
in the House on September 21. First, most Representatives appeared
to view the bill as an airline bailout, and saw Title IV as an add-on.
Even those who spoke in opposition (mostly Democrats) primarily
objected to its lack of compensation for laid-off airline employees. 39
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the bill was rushed, and ap-
parently most Representatives did not read it. Representative Don
Young himself admitted, "I know most of my colleagues have not read
the bill."'40 Yet he refused to extend the debate while thirty Demo-
crats waited to speak. 41 Meanwhile, at least one Representative inti-
mated that the rush was not connected to any outside events, but
rather to a desire to push a bill through late on a Friday night.42 As
Representative Conyers, who supported the bill, complained:
[T]here has been almost no semblance of fair or deliberate proce-
dure on the legislation. We had no committee markup. We had no
committee hearings on the bill. The bill itself was drafted in the
dead of night, and has not been available to most members until a
few hours before the vote. This is not the way we should legislate
on a minor piece of legislation, let alone a major bill that impacts
36. See id.
37. Id. at H5911 (statement of Rep. LaFalce).
38. See id. at H5914 (statement of Rep. Conyers).
39. See, e.g., id. at H5916 (statement of Rep. Inslee).
40. Id. at H5908-09.
41. See id. at H5904 (statement of Rep. Young) (objecting to Rep. DeFazio's request to ex-
tend debate).
42. See also id. at H5900 (statement of Rep. Lipinski) ("[W]e do not have to pass this legisla-
tion tonight. The real deadline is this coming Wednesday, because Wednesday is the day when
the airlines lose their insurance. So we could work on this bill Saturday, Sunday, Monday, Tues-
day, and even Wednesday .... ").
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our entire airline industry. If this issue is so important, why are we
voting so late this Friday evening, without time to review or con-
sider these serious measures? Why not take the time to read this
legislation carefully? In our desperation to help our fellow citizens,
I fear we are pushing to judgment without recognizing the complex-
ity or importance of these issues.43
2. The Debate in the Senate
The Senate discussed the victims' compensation provisions much
more than the House did but did not broach the fundamental norma-
tive questions behind the details. The first discussion came during the
procedural unanimous consent question, before the bill was techni-
cally open for debate on the merits. The second speaker, Senator Ben
Nelson of Florida, praised the victim compensation element as a solu-
tion to the pending insurance crisis:
The second component that came out of our hearing was that the
airlines, in order to be able to operate, have to have insurance that
is available and affordable. That is what is creating the crisis right
now, that several of the insurance carriers are about to yank the
coverage from the airlines. Of course, the airlines will be grounded
if that is going to occur. That is what is so important in this package
that is coming out that the majority leader and the Republican
leader are about to describe, a component of victims' compensation
which would eliminate a lot of the uncertainty about all that collat-
eral damage that had been done as a result of the World Trade
Center being rammed by those two jet liners and where would be
the source of that funding.44
Senator Mitch McConnell, on the other hand, was more concerned
about the plaintiffs' bar:
My only concern with this bill is that . . . there is no limit in this
legislation on the amount of lawyer fees that personal injury lawyers
can receive for filing lawsuits, either in absolute terms or as a per-
centage of the victim's recovery. In other words, there is no guaran-
tee that the victims or their families will receive an amount of the
damages awarded to ensure that the personal injury lawyers do not
end up taking the lion's share of the award... I wish the legislation
had included at least a 25-percent cap on fees, such as is already the
case in the Federal Tort Claims Act today.45
Once the hour of actual debate began, there was some substantive
discussion of victims' compensation. 46 New York's Senator Charles
43. Id. at H5914 (statement of Rep. Conyers).
44. 147 CONG. REC. S9585 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001) (statement of Sen. Nelson).
45. Id. at S9586 (statement of Sen. McConnell).
46. As in the House, the principal source of complaint about the bill appeared to be the lack
of relief for laid-off airline workers. See, e.g., id. at S9593 (statement of Sen. Boxer).
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Schumer identified the underlying equity issue that, he hinted, was the
purpose of the victim compensation fund: without it, victims in the
airplanes would recover, but victims on the ground would probably
get nothing.47
Soon afterward, Senator John McCain emphasized the goal of en-
suring that victims got something. He pointed out that the tort system
would lead to one of "two unsatisfactory outcomes: 1. that the airlines,
whose liability insurance coverage is insufficient to cover all damage,
would be dissolved as their assets were sold to pay off their liability
and/or; 2. some or all of the victims who were injured or killed in this
tragedy would receive no compensation. 48 The purpose of the fund,
he explained, was to avoid either outcome. The purpose was not to
produce awards comparable to those of the tort system:
It is not the intent of the federal fund to [try to make the victims or
their families "whole."] Nor is it the intent of the fund to duplicate
the arbitrary, wildly divergent awards that sometimes come from our
deeply flawed tort system .... The intent of the fund is to ensure
that the victims ... and their families do not suffer financial hard-
ship in addition to the terrible hardships they already have been
forced to endure.49
Other Senators, while not explicitly addressing normative questions,
seemed to agree with this model of averting imminent financial hard-
ship. 50 Few, if any, appeared to have Cantor Fitzgerald stockbrokers
in mind. Senator Patrick Leahy, who was the first speaker to give
some details about Title IV's mechanics, explained that "[t]his pro-
gram is targeted to help the neediest victims and their families ....
We literally had children who kissed their parents good-bye in the
morning and came home at night and found that they were orphans,
and the mortgage is due in 2 weeks. '' 51
As in the House, several Senators expressed concern about the bill's
rush to passage. 52 Only one Senator appeared to understand the un-
precedented nature of the Special Master's authority under the bill.5 3
47. Id. at S9593 (statement of Sen. Schumer).
48. Id. at S9594 (statement of Sen. McCain).
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., id. at S9594 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("This will help ensure that injured people
receive money and receive it faster than they otherwise would if left to pursue claims through
litigation.").
51. Id. at S9599 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
52. See, e.g., id. at S9601 (statement of Sen. Sessions) ("I know this bill is probably moving on
to passage tonight. I am troubled by it. We are going to need to do some work on it in the future,
and I expect we will be coming back and revisiting this. I think that should be made clear.").
53. See id. at S9602 (statement of Sen. Nickles)
Although I think the committees and the other people who worked on it did a pretty
good job, the special master has enormous responsibility under this legislation, to be
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Despite considerably more discussion in the Senate than in the House,
the race to draft, debate, and pass the bill left little time for reflection
on how well the Senate's asserted purpose for the Fund-helping the
"neediest victims"-matched with the text of the bill that it passed.
D. The Regulations
On November 5, 2001, the Department of Justice (DOJ) requested
public input on a small number of issues.54 The DOJ noted that the
Special Master had not yet been appointed but that it wanted as much
public comment as feasible before issuing the regulations by Decem-
ber 21, 2001. The DOJ received over 800 comments in response,
many on topics not within the scope of the DOJ's initial notice of
inquiry.55
On November 26, 2001, the Attorney General appointed Kenneth
Feinberg as Special Master. On December 21, 2001-the statutory
deadline-the DOJ promulgated an "Interim Final Rule. ' 56 Because
of the tight time frame, and because of the desire to start receiving
and processing claims immediately, the DOJ used various exceptions
in the Administrative Procedure Act to avoid the requirements of no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking, and to make the Interim Final Rule ef-
fective immediately while receiving further comments.5 7 The DOJ
received thousands of comments, and the Special Master "met person-
ally with more than 1,000 victims, victims' advocates, public officials,
and others" before promulgating the Final Rule. 58 The Final Rule
clarified and modified various points and took effect immediately. 59
1I. STRUCTURE OF THE FUND
Title IV has nine provisions, which can be divided into four categories:
Introductory: Section 401 is the short title "September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001," and section 403 is a statement of
purpose.
making determinations on what family survivors will receive, what injured members
and individual will receive .... I am not against having a victims' compensation sec-
tion, but when we put this together in a short period of time, I am not sure we did it the
best way.
54. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 55,901 (Nov. 5,
2001).
55. See id. at 66,275-76.
56. See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Interim Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg.
66,274 (Dec. 21, 2001) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104 (2003)).
57. See id. at 66,280.
58. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233 (Mar. 13, 2002).
59. See id. at 11,244.
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Special Master: Sections 404 and 407 describe the Special Master
and his duties.
Eligibility and payment: Section 405 and 406 define the substantive
criteria for eligibility and basic procedural requirements, and sec-
tion 402 defines certain key terms used by section 405.
Lawsuits: Section 408 creates an exclusive federal cause of action
for September 11th claims against air carriers, limiting air carrier
liability to the extent of insurance coverage; section 409 gives the
United States a right of subrogation.
A. Purpose
Title IV states that its purpose is "to provide compensation to any
individual (or relatives of a deceased individual) who was physically
injured or killed as a result of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of
September 11, 2001."60 By its terms this excludes anyone who only
suffered property or business loss. This exclusion is repeated in the
section on eligibility.
B. Special Master
The Special Master is "appointed by the Attorney General," (i.e.,
without confirmation by the Senate). 61 "[A]cting through [the] Spe-
cial Master," the Attorney General was authorized to administer the
Fund, "promulgate all procedural and substantive rules," and "employ
and supervise hearing officers and other administrative personnel. '62
The Special Master was also required to develop a claim form, prefer-
ably one that may be filed electronically, that requests information
concerning the victim's injury or death, economic and noneconomic
losses, and collateral compensation.63
A short deadline was imposed for promulgating regulations. The
Attorney General, this time "in consultation with" the Special Master,
was required to promulgate implementing regulations not later than
ninety days after enactment of ATSA, that is, December 21, 2001.64
Because Title IV itself contained very few details, the regulations had
to be comprehensive. They needed to include claim forms, the infor-
mation to be included with them, procedures for hearing and present-
ing evidence, procedures for filing and pursuing a claim, and anything
else that the Attorney General deemed appropriate. 65
60. ATSA, supra note 15, § 403.
61. See id. § 404(a).
62. Id. § 404(a)(1)-(3).
63. Id. § 405(2)(A)-(B)(iii).
64. Id. § 407.
65. Id. § 407(1)-(5).
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There is a subtle but distinct contrast between the language of sec-
tions 404 (Special Master) and 407 (regulations) on one hand and 405
(eligibility) and 406 (payment) on the other. In section 404, the "At-
torney General, acting through a Special Master," administers the pro-
gram, and in section 407, the "Attorney General, in consultation with
the Special Master" promulgates regulations on various topics, includ-
ing "matters determined appropriate by the Attorney General. '66 In
each case, procedural and supervisory responsibility appears to lie
with the Attorney General. By contrast, section 405-by far Title IV's
lengthiest provision-authorizes claimants to file compensation claims
"with the Special Master" and describes the criteria the Special
Master should employ in. evaluating claims, without once mentioning
the Attorney General.67 Similarly, section 406 discusses the Special
Master's determinations of compensation and authorization of pay-
ment, and the Attorney General appears only briefly to accept dona-
tions from private parties. 68
Read together, these provisions suggest a framework in which the
Attorney General designs the framework of the Fund and defines its
regulations, while the Special Master determines eligibility and com-
pensation. Put differently, arguably the Attorney General was to be
responsible for questions of law, and the Special Master for questions
of fact-a role similar to that of the typical court-appointed special
master. As history actually developed, however, Feinberg appeared
to take responsibility both for determinations of fact and the design of
the Fund's procedures. 69
C. Eligibility and Payment
1. Who Can File a Claim?
a. Statutory Definitions
A "claimant" is any individual who files a claim with the Fund.70 A
claimant must then qualify as an "eligible individual" under section
405(c). 7' An "eligible individual" must be either: (1) an individual
66. ATSA, supra note 15, §§ 404, 407, 407(5) (emphasis added).
67. See id. § 405.
68. See id. § 406.
69. This interpretation of Congress's delegation has been upheld by the Southern District of
New York. See Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F. Supp. 2d 273, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs'
claim that "Congress did not delegate to the Special Master the power to prescribe the standards
by which awards are determined ... [and] that the Special Master was to serve as a quasi-judicial
official responsible for assessing evidence and calculating awards according to criteria defined by
Congress.").
70. See ATSA, supra note 15, § 402(3).
71. See id. §§ 402(5), 405(c).
[Vol. 53:627
APPENDIX
who was present at one of the crash sites "at the time, or in the imme-
diate aftermath" of the crash, and suffered physical harm or death as a
result; (2) a passenger on one of the flights, minus the hijackers them-
selves; or (3) the "personal representative" of a decedent who died
aboard one of the flights or at one of the crash sites. 72 Only one claim




The Interim Final Rule placed strict time limits on the "immediate
aftermath" and "physical harm." The "immediate aftermath" was de-
fined as within twelve hours after the crashes for non-rescue workers,
and within ninety-six hours after the crashes for "rescue workers who
assisted in efforts to search for and recover victims. '74 Similarly,
"physical harm" required "a physical injury that was treated by a med-
ical professional within 24 hours of the injury having been sustained or
within 24 hours of rescue," and, in non-fatal cases, required "contem-
poraneous medical records. '75
These terms were somewhat controversial and received negative
public comments. One commenter "indicated that-despite being se-
riously injured-he spent more than 24 hours trying to locate his fam-
ily members."'76 Others were "persuaded not to seek treatment in the
24 hours following the attacks in order to allow physicians to care for
those suffering potentially life-threatening injuries. ' 77 Hence, the re-
vised final rule expanded "physical harm" to include injuries:
treated by a medical professional within 24 hours of the injury hav-
ing been sustained, or within 24 hours of rescue, or within 72 hours
of injury or rescue for those victims who were unable to realize im-
mediately the extent of their injuries or for whom treatment by a
medical professional was not available on September 11, or within
such time period as the Special Master may determine for rescue
personnel who did not or could not obtain treatment by a medical
professional within 72 hours."'78
Intriguingly, the regulations do not contain a proximate cause limi-
tation. This omission was necessary in order to cover rescue workers
who were injured after the actual crash. Arguably the omission might
72. See id. § 405(c)(2)(A)-(C).
73. See id. § 405(c)(3)(A).
74. 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,282, § 104.2(b).
75. Id. § 104.2(c)(1), (2).
76. 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,242.
77. Id.
78. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, § 104.2(c)(1), 67 Fed. Reg. 11.233,
11,245 (Mar. 13, 2002).
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have led to problems of overinclusion, but there is nothing to suggest
that any such problems arose.
c. Personal Representative
The statute does not define "personal representative" (the claimant
who may file on behalf of a deceased victim), and early on a contro-
versy arose as to who could qualify. The most controversial potential
personal representatives were ex-spouses and domestic partners (in-
cluding same-sex domestic partners). Many wanted these people to
qualify, and many did not.
The Interim Final Rule relied on state law to provide the criteria for
determining this question.79 The personal representative is either
"[a]n individual appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction as the
Personal Representative of the decedent or as the executor or admin-
istrator of the decedent's will or estate" or, if no such person has been
appointed by a court, then "the first person in the line of succession
established by the laws of the decedent's domicile governing intes-
tacy." 80 The Special Master explained that this reference to state law
was necessary because of the quid pro quo nature of the Fund: "[I]f
the identity of Personal Representatives for purposes of this Fund
were determined by federal regulation, there could be many situations
in which the representative as defined by state law would choose liti-
gation while the Personal Representative as defined by federal regula-
tion would seek to recover from the Fund."
81
After the Interim Final Rule was issued, this decision was "[o]ne of
the topics receiving the most comments. '82 However, the Special
Master suggested in response that "criticisms of some of the poten-
tially applicable state laws ... are more properly directed toward state
officials," and offered the limited consolation that "intestacy laws are
relevant only in the absence of a valid will."83 He also added that if
the state-law next of kin supports distribution to a same-sex partner,
then "'[c]ut[ting] a check for the same sex partner ... will be no prob-
lem . . . [I]t's a ministerial function. '84 There was no change in the
revised rule.
79. See id. § 104.4, 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,283.
80. Id. § 104.4(a)(1)-(2).
81. 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,277.
82. 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,242.
83. Id. at 11,243.
84. Jane Gross, U.S. Fund for Tower Victims Will Aid Some Gay Partners, N.Y. TIMES, May
30, 2002, at Al.
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2. Determining an Eligible Individual's Award
a. Award Computation
Once a claimant is determined to be an eligible individual, the Spe-
cial Master is required to consider two criteria and forbidden from
considering others. First, he must consider "the extent of the harm to
the claimant, including any economic and noneconomic losses," where
''noneconomic losses" means "losses for physical and emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish, disfig-
urement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship,
loss of consortium (other than loss of domestic service), hedonic dam-
ages, injury to reputation, and all other nonpecuniary losses of any
kind or nature. ' 85 Second, he must consider "the amount of compen-
sation to which the claimant is entitled based on the harm to the
claimant, the facts of the claim, and the individual circumstances of
the claimant. ' 86 On the other hand, he is forbidden from considering
''negligence or any other theory of liability" and "may not include
amounts for punitive damages. '87
The statute left the Special Master broad leeway to devise a method
for award calculation, so long as he confined his criteria to those in the
statute. For instance, it would have been entirely consistent with the
statute to ask each claimant to prove individual economic losses based
on individual circumstances, or, at the other extreme, to impose a grid.
He chose a middle path: a grid with departures allowing for unusual
circumstances. The system works as follows:
85. ATSA, supra note 15, §§ 402(7), 405(b)(1)(B)(i).
86. Id. § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii).
87. Id. § 405(b)(2), (5).
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Victim died (claimant = Victim injured but lived
Type of Loss personal representative) (claimant = victim)
Minimum award before * $500k for decedent with -
collateral source offset spouse/dependent.
9 $300k for single decedent
with no dependents.
Loss of earnings/business • Calculated from "presump- e Case-by-case, based on
opportunities tive, non-binding estimated actual amount of work
award ' 8 8 grid based on missed without compensa-
decedent's age; number of tion.
surviving dependents; * Or can use grid methodol-
whether survived by a ogy and adjust based on
spouse; amount and nature extent of physical harm.
of decedent's income for
1998-2000.
9 May be adjusted based on
individual circumstances.
Noneconomic loss * $250k plus an additional * Start with figures for non-
$100k for spouse and each economic loss for deceased
dependent. victims, then adjust based
9 Includes noneconomic on extent of physical harm.
component of replacement * Includes noneconomic
services loss. component of replacement
- (No adjustment for man- services loss.
ner/circumstances of - (No adjustment for man-
death.) ner/circumstances of
injury.)
Medical expenses * Actual out-of-pocket o Actual out-of-pocket
expenses not reimbursed expenses not reimbursed
by health insurance, by health insurance, plus
estimated future medical
expenses.
Replacement services * Used to value loss of earn- * Used to value loss of earn-
ings for victims who did ings for victims who did
not work full-time outside not work full-time outside
the home. the home.
Death/burial costs o Actual out-of-pocket
expenses.
Disability - Total perma- May accept determination
nent of Social Security Adminis-
tration, other government
agencies, or private insur-
ers, or may require evalua-
tion by medical experts.
Disability - Partial Consider both ability to
perform usual occupation
and ability to perform
usual daily activities.
Sources: 28 C.F.R. §§ 104.41-.46.
Aspects of this system reflect interesting value choices. First, the
"presumed, non-binding estimated award" for earnings loss of dece-
88. 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,236.
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dents has many procedural and fairness advantages.8 9 In a system
with multiple claims evaluators, it encourages uniformity and cabins
discretion without removing the ability to make exceptions for unu-
sual cases. However, the principal benefit stems from the voluntary
nature of the Fund. Publishing presumed awards "enable[s] claimants
to make informed decisions regarding whether to submit a claim." 90
This purpose is further emphasized by the fact that surviving claimants
generally receive a case-by-case determination, with no advance pre-
sumed award. 91 The Special Master explained this provision by saying
that "these schedules, tables, or charts cannot cover every possible
claimant (e.g., injured claimants). '92 As an explanation, this is inade-
quate. Workers' compensation and other no-fault programs have al-
most a century's experience in quantifying the economic loss of a
finger, an ear, an arm, etc. A more likely explanation is that claims on
behalf of decedents are worth more in tort, and thus the Fund needs
to take extra steps, for example, publishing expected awards, to woo
them. In contrast, surviving victims are less likely to sue in tort, are
more likely to choose the Fund, and hence require less convincing in
advance.
Unlike the income-based grid for economic losses, noneconomic
losses for decedents are based on a flat sum. The Special Master ac-
knowledged that:
each person experienced the unspeakable events of that day in a
unique way. Some victims experienced terror for many minutes, as
they were held hostage by terrorists on an airplane or trapped in a
burning building. Some victims had no warning of what was coming
and died within seconds of a plane hitting the building in which they
worked. While these circumstances may be knowable in a few ex-
traordinary circumstances, for the vast majority of victims these cir-
cumstances are unknowable.93
Besides simplifying calculation, flat-sum noneconomic losses also
partially respond to critiques of the inequity of compensating stock-
brokers more than janitors. 94 As one commentator complained:
[T]he compensation fund has been seen as a replacement for litiga-
tion .... Once the compensation fund was viewed as a surrogate for
litigation, the calculations for disbursement fell into the same trap
that has long plagued the legal system .... The formula reflects the
89. Id.
90. 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,278.
91. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.45(a) (2001).
92. See id.
93. 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,279.




values of the tort system, which pragmatically reduces loss to a
monetary calculation. But the purpose of the compensation fund is
greater: to serve as a national expression of unity in the face of a
tragedy unique in American history, as well as to help survivors.
While juries are instructed routinely not to permit their sympathy
for victims to enter into their consideration of damage awards, this
fund represents an attempt to embody our collective sympathy....
The families of the firefighter and the financier, the broker and the
busboy, with their shared emotional losses, should be compensated
equally. What ultimately unites the victims and their survivors with
each other and with the nation is far greater than the differences in
their last paychecks. 95
Given the voluntary quid pro quo nature of the Fund, the only way
truly equal compensation could have been provided would be to com-
pensate everyone at the stockbroker level, which would have been
unaffordable (and arguably incompatible with the statute); anything
less would have pushed stockbrokers' families to the tort system.
Therefore, the Special Master had to offer stockbrokers' survivors
much more than janitors' survivors. Given that, perhaps using a flat
fee for noneconomic loss compensation partially mollifies janitors'
survivors.
The particular number for noneconomic loss ($250,000) was se-
lected because it is "roughly equivalent to the amounts received under
existing federal programs by public safety officers who are killed while
on duty, or members of our military who are killed in the line of duty
while serving our nation. ' 96 This statement can be interpreted in sev-
eral ways. It might mean that $250,000 is a standard government ref-
erence point for the value of a life (unlikely, since regulatory agencies
typically value a life at a million dollars or more); or that $250,000 is a
standard government reference point for how much to compensate a
decedent's victims above and beyond earnings-based death benefits
(perhaps, but then one would expect to see references to death insur-
ance benefits provided to civilian government employees); or, most
intriguingly, that the government considers everyone killed on Sep-
tember llth to be, at least symbolically, "killed in the line of duty
while serving our nation."
The $250,000 figure was not without critics. Victims' groups and
Northeastern politicians urged the Special Master to increase it, not-
ing that jury awards for noneconomic loss in airline crash cases often
run into the millions.97 Trial Lawyers Care criticized the flat figure for
95. Michael I. Meyerson, Losses of Equal Value, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, at 4-15.
96. Id.
97. David Barstow, Final Rules for Federal Victims' Fund Increase Aid to Families of Sept. 11
Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at B4.
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noneconomic loss as "[t]he only area in which the regulations still de-
part from the statute" for using the presumptive methodology, and
characterized the $100,000 per spouse or dependent supplement as
"arbitrary and unrealistically low." 98
b. Collateral Source Offset
The statute requires the Special Master to deduct from the initial
award "the amount of the collateral source compensation ... the
claimant has received or is entitled to receive" because of the at-
tacks.99 This provision has two ambiguities: the first has not yet at-
tracted much attention, but the second was the source of a serious
open controversy. First, the award is reduced by the amount of the
claimant's collateral source compensation. If there are multiple bene-
ficiaries-for instance, a spouse and several children-they may be
entitled to differing amounts of collateral source compensation. This
ambiguity-resulting from the same narrow definition of a claimant as
the individual filing the claim-creates an incentive for the family
member with the least outside compensation to file the claim. Indeed,
the Final Rule gives the Special Master discretion to exclude collateral
sources "where the recipients of collateral source compensation are
not beneficiaries of the awards from the Fund."'100 The family mem-
ber with the most collateral source compensation (e.g., the beneficiary
of the life insurance policy) may simply waive participation in the
Fund and keep his or her right to sue.10 1
Second, and much better known, is the controversy over whether
charitable contributions should qualify as collateral source compensa-
tion. The statute defines "collateral source" as "all collateral sources,
including life insurance, pension funds, death benefit programs, and
payments by Federal, State, or local governments" related to the
attacks. l0 2
An early controversy erupted over the Fund's treatment of charita-
ble contributions. The three advantages of counting charitable contri-
butions as a collateral source are that it would: (1) "help even out the
98. Leo V. Boyle, President, ATLA, & Larry S. Stewart, President, Trial Lawyers Care, Inc.,
Improvements Make September lth Victim Compensation Fund Regulations Fairer (Mar. 7,
2002), available at http://www.911lawhelp.org/info/news/mar7.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2003).
99. ATSA, supra note 15, § 405(b)(6).
100. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47(a) (2001). Thus, for example, if a victim's spouse is the Fund claimant,
but the victim's life insurance is paid only to her child, the Special Master has the discretion to
not deduct the life insurance from the award. A spouse and child in collaboration could use this
provision strategically by having the spouse, not the child, file.
101. See also infra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
102. Id. § 402(4) (emphasis added).
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flow of aid to those who have not benefited from specialized fund-
raising efforts"; 10 3 (2) reduce taxpayer costs; and (3) avoid penalizing
early charitable donors by making them pay twice, once as a donor
and once as a taxpayer. To many, however, these advantages seemed
outweighed by the disadvantages. The logical response of private phi-
lanthropy to collateral source reduction would be "to steer more of its
aid to the thousands of affected families excluded from the federal
fund," for example, those who were not injured but lost their jobs. 10 4
But many donors expressly "specified that their gifts [were] to be used
only for direct victims-the same people who [would] benefit from the
new fund. ' 10 5 Thus, charitable collateral source reduction would re-
sult in a loss of total awards for "core" victims (those who lost rela-
tives at the crash sites) without any corresponding gain (either from
the Fund or private charity) for "non-core" victims. Robert Clifford,
the chairman of the American Bar Association Task Force on Terror-
ism and the Law, flatly declared that the Fund's effect on private char-
ity was "clearly something [Congress] never thought about,"' 0 6 and
several of the bill's drafters acknowledged that "this was a question
that was overlooked in their haste to create a fund.
10 7
During the weeks after ATSA's passage, this ambiguity festered
and affected both donation and distribution of private charity.108 Clif-
ford worried that charitable donation would "come to a halt" until the
Attorney General clarified the question.10 9 And if the Fund did re-
duce awards by the amount of charitable donations, "major charities
might ... simply withhold their aid until after the fund had made its
awards-an outcome that would have slowed the flow of charitable
support to needy families."'110
To the relief of many, the Interim Final Rule specifically excluded
charitable donations. It noted that "charitable contributions are dif-
ferent in kind from the collateral sources listed in the Act" and that
"deducting charitable awards from the amount of compensation
would have the perverse effect of encouraging potential donors to





108. See David Barstow & Diana B. Henriques, A Nation Challenged: The Charities; Debate
Over Rules for Victims Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2001, at Al.
109. See Henriques & Barstow, supra note 18.




withhold their giving until after claimants have received their awards
from the Fund." '' This decision was retained in the revised rule. 12
D. Lawsuits
ATSA has four major effects on civil litigation:
1. Claimants must waive their right to sue because of damages sus-
tained because of the crashes, and withdraw any already-pending
suits by March 21, 2002. (This does not apply to suits to recover
collateral source obligations or against the terrorists.) 113
2. It creates an exclusive federal cause of action, with original and
exclusive jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York, for
all actions for damages arising out of the crashes.114 In any such
suit, the substantive law and choice of law are borrowed from the
state where the crash occurred." 15
3. Liability against any air carrier is limited to the extent of its lia-
bility insurance coverage.' 1 6
4. The United States has the right of subrogation against any judg-
ment in favor of a successful Fund claimant.11 7
The quid pro quo of the statutory design requires Fund claimants to
waive the right to sue in tort. However, due perhaps to a drafting
oversight, there are several mismatches in the quid and the quo.
First, the waiver applies to "damages sustained as a result of the
terrorist-related aircraft crashes," which is broader than the damages
that the Fund purports to compensate.11 8 For instance, the Fund does
not compensate for property damage, but a claimant must waive the
right to sue for such damage. Thus, a claimant who suffered property
damage and was injured must waive both the right to sue for physical
and emotional harm (for which he or she will be compensated from
the Fund) and property loss (for which he or she will not be compen-
sated from the Fund). The quid does not match the quo. Moreover,
there is no proximate cause limitation on the scope of the waiver.
Thus, a claimant who broke an arm in the collapse and then was hit by
111. 66 Fed. Reg. at 66,279.
112. See 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,241.
113. See ATSA, supra note 15, § 405(c)(3)(B)(i)-(ii). The provision does not specifically men-
tion air carrier defendants, so a claimant waives the right to sue anybody except collateral source
obligors.
114. See id. § 408(b)(3). The exclusive federal cause of action also sweeps more broadly than
the Fund: it covers any suit for "damages arising out of the hijacking and subsequent crashes."
See id. § 408(b)(1).
115. Id. § 408(b)(2).
116. Id. § 408(a).
117. Id. § 409.
118. See ATSA, supra note 15, § 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
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a speeding ambulance, breaking a leg, probably must waive his or her
suit against the ambulance in order to claim for the broken arm. Un-
less the Special Master intends to impose no proximate cause limita-
tion on the Fund's awards, 119 the quid again does not match the quo.
Second, unintended consequences arise where a claimant is the per-
sonal representative of a decedent. Under ATSA section 405, the
waiver attaches to the claimant, not the claim. As one commentator
described the problem: "While Congress logically could intend that
every Fund beneficiary waive his right to file ATSA's exclusive civil
damages action, Congress's statute does not say that. On the con-
trary, it says something quite different and odd. 120 The problem is
that only "the claimant" must waive the right to file, and "claimant" is
defined as "an individual filing a claim. 12 ' This introduces two po-
tential problems: under-waiver and over-waiver. Under-waiver occurs
when the rights of the claim are held by more than just the claimant,
and over-waiver occurs when the claimant has rights beyond those of
the claim.122 Both problems are created by the statute's incorrect fo-
cus on the identity of the claimant, rather than the nature of the claim.
1. Under-Waiver
When the underlying eligible individual is deceased and left several
dependents, there might be multiple Fund beneficiaries even though
there is only one claimant. If a dead crash-site victim left four chil-
dren, one could apparently file as personal representative, waive the
right to sue, collect an award based on the size of the decedent's fam-
ily, distribute the award among his or her siblings, and leave the other
three (who were not claimants, and therefore did not waive anything)
free to sue the airlines. 123 The Special Master has attempted to solve
this problem in the regulations, by requiring the claimant to certify
that "there is no pending lawsuit brought by a dependent, spouse, or
beneficiary of the victim. 1 24
119. See supra, notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
120. Joan Bernott Maginnis, The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund. Overview and Comment 15,
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Ferrorism/VictimFund.PDF (last visited Oct. 30,
2003).
121. See ATSA, supra note 15, §§ 402(3), 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
122. See also supra note 118 and accompanying text (over-waiver where claimant has both
injury and property claims).
123. See Maginnis, supra note 120, at 15. However, the federal government has "the right of
subrogation with respect to any claim paid by the United States" under Title IV. ATSA, supra
note 15, § 409 (emphasis added). Arguably, therefore, the federal government would have the
right of subrogation against the nonclaimant beneficiaries if they succeeded in their suits.




This problem created by the statute may not arise on the September
11th facts, but it is certainly plausible in principle. Assume X died at
the site, leaving only one heir, Y (a child or spouse), who was also
present at the site and was injured but survived. If Y is the claimant
for X, then, in order to receive the Fund's payments on behalf of X, Y
must waive her own, independent claims. The same applies if Y was
not injured, but suffered property damage. In this case, the Special
Master did not attempt to correct Congress's error.125
3. Withdrawal of Pending Suits
The statute requires that any person already party to a suit for
which waiver would be required must withdraw from that suit by
March 11, 2002 in order to submit a claim. 126 The first test of this
requirement came in September 2002. Under New York law, any suit
against the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (which oper-
ated the World Trade Center) must be filed within a year of the inci-
dent, and a notice of claim to the agency is required sixty days before
filing.127 Over one thousand notices were filed1 28 With the deadline
for filing suit on September 10, 2002 looming, a judge in the Southern
District of New York ruled that suits timely filed against the Port Au-
thority would be "suspended and shall remain dormant" while the
plaintiffs decided whether to file a claim with the Fund. 29
III. PROCEDURES
ATSA provides very little detail about the procedures to be used in
administering the Fund. Most of its procedural provisions are simply
grants of authority to the Special Master. The bulk of the procedural
framework is found in the regulations. The following is a summary of
the claims, determination, hearing, and award process combining both
statutory and regulatory elements.
The claimant begins the process by filing an "Eligibility Form" and
either a "Personal Injury Compensation Form" or a "Death Compen-
125. See 67 Fed. Reg. at 11,246, (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 104.61(a) (2001)).
126. ATSA, supra note 15, § 405(c)(3)(B)(ii); 28 C.F.R. § 104.61(b).
127. See David W. Chen, Hundreds of 9/11 Families File for Right To Sue Port Authority, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2002, at B4.
128. See Benjamin Weiser, Judge Says Sept. 11 Families Can Change Minds on Suing, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2002, at B3.
129. Mulligan v. Port Auth'y of N.Y. & N.J., No. 02 Civ. 6885, 2002 WL 31008974, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2002).
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sation Form," as appropriate. 130 The form is deemed "filed" when it is
"substantially complete"; this is relevant for the claimant's right to a
determination within 120 days of filing. 31 Put cynically, the Special
Master can delay processing a claim-and avoid the statutory dead-
lines-by refusing to certify it as "substantially complete. ' 132
The claimant may also apply for advance benefits, a concept intro-
duced by the regulations. In the case of a dead victim, a spouse, or
other claimant who has the consent of the spouse (or, if there is no
spouse, all the dependents) may be eligible for advance benefits if
there is immediate financial hardship and if the claimant has not re-
ceived substantial collateral source compensation. 133 Advance bene-
fits for a deceased victim's personal representative are $50,000. A
surviving victim is eligible for advance benefits of $25,000 if he or she
was hospitalized for a week or more. Payment of advance benefits
occurs within fifteen days after a claims evaluator confirms the claim-
ant's eligibility, assuming there are no conflicting claims. Advance
benefits are credited against any future award, and accepting them
requires the claimant to waive certain other deadlines. 134
The claimant selects one of two procedural tracks on the compensa-
tion form: Track A or Track B. On Track A, the claims evaluator de-
termines the claimant's eligibility and presumed award from the
presumed award grid. The claimant receives notice of the presumed
award within forty-five days of filing. The claimant may then accept
the presumed award immediately, or request a hearing before the
Special Master or his designated "hearing officer" of either the award
amount, or a finding of ineligibility. 135 If the claimant accepts the
award, payment must be made within twenty days. 136 Because Track
A creates the possibility of receiving an award within sixty-five days of
filing if the claimant is willing to accept the presumed award, it is most
appealing to claimants who either need the money very quickly, or do
130. See generally 28 C.F.R. § 104.21 (2001). The requirements for how the procedures them-
selves were developed are discussed supra.
131. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.21(a); see also ATSA, supra note 15, § 405(b)(3) (providing that the
Special Master shall issue a determination not later than 120 days after the date on which a claim
is filed).
132. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
133. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.21(b)(5).
134. See id. § 104.22.
135. See id. § 104.31(b)(1).
136. ATSA, supra note 15, § 406(a). Technically, payment must be made within twenty days
after a final determination is made. Since the Special Master cannot know for certain whether a
Track A claimant intends to accept the presumed award until after the deadline for filing supple-




not have reason to believe they will receive more than the presumed
award.
On Track B, the claims evaluator simply determines the claimant's
eligibility, but not a presumed award. The claimant receives notice of
eligibility within forty-five days of filing. After that, the claimant pro-
ceeds to a hearing to determine the award. 137 Because Track B re-
quires a hearing, it is more attractive to claimants who believe they
can convince the hearing officer to depart upwards from the presumed
award, and can afford to wait.
A claimant seeking review of his or her presumed award under
Track A, or a Track B claimant, has twenty-one days after receiving
notice to file supplemental submissions. 138 The hearing is scheduled,
where practicable, "at times and in locations convenient to the claim-
ant or his or her representative." 139
At the hearing, the claimant may present "any evidence relevant to
the determination of the award.' 140 The claimant has the right to (but
need not) be represented by an attorney, or present witnesses, includ-
ing expert witnesses or both. 141 The hearing is inquisitorial, not adver-
sarial; the hearing officer may question witnesses and examine
experts' credentials.1 42
In a Track A hearing, the issues for the hearing officer are whether
(1) there was an error in determining the presumed award or (2) the
claimant presents "extraordinary circumstances not adequately ad-
dressed by the presumptive award. 1 43 In a Track B hearing, the hear-
ing officer begins with the presumed award but may vary it if "the
claimant presents extraordinary circumstances not adequately ad-
dressed by the presumptive award methodology.' 44
After the hearing officer makes his or her decision, the Special
Master notifies the claimant of the final award in writing. 45 This must
occur within 120 days of the claimant's original filing,146 unless the
claimant applied for advance benefits, in which case, waived this 120-
day period.1 47 The Special Master's determination is final and "not
137. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.31(b)(2).
138. Id. § 104.33(a).
139. Id. § 104.33(c).
140. Id. § 104.33(b).
141. ATSA, supra note 15, § 405(b)(4)(A)-(B); 28 C.F.R. § 104.33(d).
142. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.33(d).
143. Id. § 104.33(f)(1)-(2).
144. Id. § 104.31(b)(2).
145. Id. § 10 4.33(g).
146. See ATSA, supra note 15, § 405(b)(3).
147. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.22(f).
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subject to judicial review. ' 148 Actual payment must come within
twenty days of the determination of the award. 149
The various deadlines for the two tracks, measured in days after
filing, are summarized below:1 50
Days after Track A - accepting Track A - not accepting
filing presumed award presumed award Track B
45 Receive notice of: Receive notice of: Receive notice of:
e Eligibility * Eligibility ° Eligibility
* Presumed award * Presumed award
66 Supplemental submis- Supplemental submis-
sions due sions due
86 Payment due?
1 5 1
120 Final determination Final determination
140 Payment due Payment due
IV. THE ROLE OF LAWYERS
In theory, the Fund is supposed to be simple enough to navigate
without a lawyer. The preamble to the Interim Final Rule declared
that "it is important that this Fund be accessible to potential claimants
who have limited resources and who are not trained in the law."' 52
Even at a hearing, "[t]he claimant shall be entitled to be represented
by an attorney in good standing, but it is not necessary that the claim-
ant be represented by an attorney."'1 53 The regulations also indicate
some skepticism about high legal fees:
Although the Department's regulations do not set specific limits on
attorneys fees separate from those existing in state law or attorney
ethical standards, the Department believes that contingency ar-
rangements exceeding 5% of a claimant's recovery from the Fund
would not be in the best interest of the claimants .... [T]he Special
Master will have discretion to inform potential claimants of the na-
ture of the Fund so that they may make informed decisions regard-
ing the types or amount of fees that they pay for legal or other
assistance. For example, the Special Master may notify claimants
and potential claimants of the availability of free legal services ...
[or] that the Fund is a no-fault, administrative scheme that should
not involve the kind of risks and expense that would justify any sig-
nificant contingency fees.154
148. ATSA, supra note 15, § 405(b)(3).
149. Id. § 406(a).
150. A claimant seeking advance benefits waives these deadlines. See 28 C.F.R. § 104.22.
151. See supra note 136.




The most substantial source of free legal services for Fund claimants
is Trial Lawyers Care (TLC), a project of the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America (ATLA). TLC was launched on October 15,
2001, before Feinberg was even appointed; as the ATLA President put
it, "When 500 firefighters rush into a burning building that is about to
collapse, and hundreds sacrifice their lives to rescue strangers, my fel-
low trial lawyers and I can answer the legal needs of those who suf-
fered most without charging a fee." 155 TLC has been described as
"the largest pro bono effort [the legal] profession has ever
undertaken."1 56
In practice, the Fund's supposedly simple procedures have not
worked as smoothly. First, the claim is not considered "filed," and
hence the statutory and regulatory clocks do not start ticking, until a
claims evaluator determines the claim to be "substantially complete."
As of November 12, 2002, 783 claims had been filed, but fewer than
200 had been deemed "substantially complete."'1 57 Because over
three-quarters of claims filed have been deemed to be wanting in
some way, the Fund does not appear to live up to its promise of sim-
plified procedures that can be undertaken without an attorney. In-
deed, certain claims had still not received a determination four
months after filing, and one claimant who filed for advance benefits
had still not received a penny five months later.158
TLC's estimates of the value of free legal services provide some
clue to the problem. Before the regulations had even been promul-
gated, a TLC official estimated that the typical case could require 200
hours of legal time.159 This estimate has not been revised downward
based on either the regulations or actual experience. Perhaps sensing
an opportunity, some private law firms have stepped in and are charg-
ing clients for representation. One firm that specializes in aviation
disasters is charging ten percent for Fund claims, clearly in excess of
what the regulations recommend as a maximum fee. 160
155. Remarks of Leo Boyle, President of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America and
Vice President of Trial Lawyers Care (Oct. 15, 2001), available at http://www.911lawhelp.org/
info/news/leotalk.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
156. Diana B. Henriques, Lawyers Offer Free Advice in Tapping Federal Fund, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2001, at B1l.
157. David W. Chen, Victims' Kin Find Fault with Overseer of 9/11 Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2002. at B1.
158. See id.
159. See Henriques, supra note 156.





Much of the structure, regulation, and implementation of the Fund
derives from two historical facts about the Fund's birth. First, it was
born as a last-minute addition to an airline bailout bill. Second, it was
designed to woo victims and their families'away from the tort system.
The first point explains why the statute has some strange gaps, and
why it delegates so much authority to the Special Master-there sim-
ply was not time to work out the details. The second point led to a
wide range of perhaps unanticipated but arguably inevitable conse-
quences. Awards would depend to a large extent on income.
"Previews" of expected awards would be published in advance, at
least for those with the largest potential claims, so they could evaluate
how much to expect if they filed. Same-sex domestic partners would
not be recognized any more than they would under state law.
Other aspects of the Fund derive from the fact that the government
is the ultimate payer. The Fund's procedures, limitations, and grid
methodology could have been adopted without making the govern-
ment the payer; such a system would resemble workers' compensa-
tion. Had this been the approach, the collateral source offset rule
might not have been adopted, for the purpose of the -rule was to pro-
tect taxpayers.
These points illustrate some of the choices and results implicit in the
Fund's design-choices that could, but need not, be replicated in an
compensation scheme designed in advance and without undue time
pressures.
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